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Rewriting Israeli History: New Historians and Critical Sociologists – 
Formation, Terminology, and Criticism 
The New Historians and Critical Sociologists were two groups of thinkers who 
emerged in Israel during the 1980s, strongly criticizing Israeli history and society, 
focusing mainly on the 1948 War and Israel's treatment of the Arabs. Coming 
from various backgrounds and using different methodologies, nonetheless they all 
shared a highly critical approach towards mainstream historians and sociologists, 
and, more importantly, towards key moments and issues in Israel's history. These 
thinkers blamed the Zionist establishment for having ignored the distress of the 
European Jews during the Holocaust, committing war crimes against the Arab 
population during the 1948 War, and having abused immigrants in the years after 
the State's independence. These claims raised passionate debates between 
mainstream and critical scholars, which strongly affected Israeli society. This 
paper examines the processes that led to the emergence of these thinkers, and 
analyzes the specific terminology they employed, as well as their opponents' 
criticisms. It explores how processes in Israeli society, military and politics, as 
well as non-academic developments led to the emergence of these thinkers, who 
sought not only to rewrite Israeli history, but also to reshape Israeli collective 
consciousness. 
 
Přepis izraelské historie: Noví historikové a kritičtí sociologové – vznik, terminologie a 
kritika 
V osmdesátých letech dvacátého století se v Izraeli objevily dva nové myšlenkové 
proudy: noví historikové a kritičtí sociologové. Tyto skupiny silně kritizovaly izraelské 
dějiny a izraelskou společnost a ve své kritice se zaměřovaly především na první arabsko-
izraelskou válku v roce 1948 a na způsob, jakým v tomto období Izrael zacházel s 
arabským obyvatelstvem. Přestože pocházeli z odlišných prostředí a používali rozdílnou 
metodologii, sdíleli příslušníci obou myšlenkových směrů výrazně kritický postoj k 
historikům a sociologům hlavního proudu a především pak ke klíčovým momentům a 
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tématům izraelských dějin. Noví historikové a kritičtí sociologové obviňovali sionistické 
vedení státu z ignorování utrpení evropských Židů během holocaustu, z páchání 
válečných zločinů proti arabskému obyvatelstvu během války v roce 1948 a ze špatného 
zacházení s přistěhovalci v letech následujících po získání nezávislosti. Cílem nových 
historiků a kritických sociologů bylo přepsat izraelskou historii a zároveň přeformovat 
izraelské kolektivní vědomí. Tvrzení těchto skupin a vášnivé debaty, ke kterým následně 
došlo mezi novými kritiky a zastánci hlavního myšlenkového proudu, poté významně 
ovlivnily izraelskou společnost. Tato práce zkoumá procesy vzniku těchto dvou skupin 
kritiků, analyzuje specifickou terminologii, kterou příslušníci těchto myšlenkových 
proudů používali, a věnuje se reakci hlavního proudu myslitelů na jejich kritiku. Práce též 
pojednává o tom, jakým způsobem byl vznik těchto dvou nových kritických 
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Up until the 1980's, Israeli historiography and sociology reflected, by and large, 
Israel's mainstream historical and sociological narratives concerning the making of 
Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The essence of this narrative runs more or less 
as follows: after two thousand years of exile, the 19
th
 century saw the awakening 
of Jewish national feeling. A Jewish national revival in Europe led to the 
formation of the Zionist organization, which sought to create a Jewish State in the 
Land of Israel. However, the Land of Israel was occupied first by the Ottoman 
Empire, and since 1917 by the British Mandate, who opposed to the Jews' 
resettlement in their motherland. Nonetheless, following threats to the European 
Jews by growing antisemitism and the development of the Jewish settlement in 
Palestine, the Zionist movement received several guarantees to a future Jewish 
"national home" from the British government, such as the Balfour Declaration 
(1917), and the Peel Commission (1936). The Zionists sought to create a 
progressive, egalitarian society in Israel, and believed their efforts would bring 
wealth and prosperity both to the Jews and the local Arab population. However, in 
spite of their good intentions, the Arabs were growing increasingly hostile towards 
the Zionists, attacking and massacring them on several occasions. At the same 
time, the Zionists were doing their best to aid the European Jews, who were facing 
antisemitism and the Holocaust. Before and during the Holocaust, the Zionist 
organization did all it could to help save the European Jews, exercising both 
diplomatic and military efforts, such as the Kasztner train in which 1,684 
Hungarian Jews were saved, and the parachuting of Zionist fighters behind enemy 
lines. In 1947, following the Second World War, the United Nations 
acknowledged the Jews' right for their own country. With Israel's declaration of 
independence, the newly founded state was immediately attacked on all frontiers 
by hostile Arab armies. During the war, Palestinians fled Israel to neighboring 
territories under their leaders' commands, and in spite of Israel's attempts to 
convince them to stay. Despite its inferior military standing, the small Israeli army 
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managed to vanquish the stronger, plentiful Arab armies. Following Israel's 
independence and victory, Jews from Muslim countries were violently expelled 
and chose to immigrate to Israel, while Holocaust survivors also chose to help 
build the newly founded state, and all Jews reunited with their fellow brethren. 
The main reason for this highly positive portrayal of Israeli history was that 
Israel being a young and small country, its history was written by people who had 
participated and who were deeply involved in its wars and foundation
1
. Not only 
did these writers take an active or supporting part in landmark events in Israeli 
history, but they also felt an obligation to describe these events in a positive light, 
downplaying controversial events. 
The 1980's saw the emergence of several historians and sociologists who 
challenged this narrative. Proclaiming themselves "new historians" and "critical 
sociologists", these thinkers sought to bring to light and public attention topics 
which were either unknown to or undiscussed by the general Israeli public. 
Because I will treat mostly the historical dimension in the sociologists' writings, 
and as these writers consist of academy members as well as journalists 
(nonetheless, with academic education), I will refer to them in this paper as the 
Critical Historians, while the "old" historians and "institutional" sociologists will 
be referred to as simply "old" historians
2
. 
The Critical Historians challenged three main issues in Israeli history: 
1. The Zionist movement's reaction and activities during the Holocaust. 
2. War crimes and the expulsion of Palestinians during the first Arab-Israeli 
War, as well as political and strategic decisions and actions made by the 
Israeli government. 
                                               
1 Shlaim, 2007, p. 125. 
2
 Many Israeli academics have debated the appropriate term to describe the various historians and 
sociologists, an attempt made all the more difficult with the changing agendas and the clashes among the 
New Historians themselves at later stages. The term Critical Historians was suggested previously by Pappé 
to differentiate post-Zionist and postmodern scholars from Morris following their fall out. In this paper the 
term Critical Historians will refer also to non-postmodern scholars of the revisionist camp. 
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3. The treatment and assimilation of immigrants by the veteran Jewish settlers 
in Palestine/Israel, and the hegemonic rule of Mapai ("Workers Party of the 
Land of Israel" later part of hama'arakh)" elite. 
Nonetheless, these thinkers are a heterogeneous group, coming from different 
backgrounds and pursuing diverse methodologies – while some used mainly 
"orthodox", positivistic research methods and argumentation, others openly used 
and professed postmodern and relativistic methodologies, and while some called 
for scientific objectivity, others called for unabashed subjectivity
3
. The Critical 
Historians also offered different accounts for their own emergence. While more 
objectivist scholars such as Benny Morris considered the opening of Israeli 
archives and previously concealed sources as the main reason for the 
reexamination of Israel's past
4
 others, such as sociologist Uri Ram focused on the 
rise of critical studies in European and American academies
5
. However, in spite of 
these differences, the common criticism these scholars expressed towards the 
official Israeli narrative and history, quickly joined them together both in their 
eyes, and in the eyes of the public and the media. 
By uncovering previously classified documents, adopting a neutral, and 
sometimes outright negative, terminology concerning what was until then 
considered the "heroic" Zionist history, the Critical Historians stirred a prolonged 
emotional discussion, which deeply affected Israeli society and the way it 
perceived its history. 
Soon after the Critical Historians caught public attention, "old historians", as 
they were now reluctantly labeled, found themselves in the need to defend 
previous historiographies and Israel's reputation. Like their "new" adversaries, the 
"old" historians were also diverse in their methodologies and argumentation. 
While some historians questioned the methods and academic capabilities of the 
                                               
3 Pappé, 1996, pp. 130-136. 
4 Morris, 2007, p. 14. 





, others accused them of downright manipulation of data to 
validate their a-priori held beliefs
7
. While some claimed the Critical Historians 
were "judging history in retrospect"
8
, others dismissed them as belated fame 
seekers, whose provocative arguments were nothing but restatements of previously 
well-known facts
9
. However, the more loaded and intense the debate was 
becoming, the clearer it became that not only were the Critical Historians not in 
the least uniform in methodology and political views, but that their claims and 
ideas were to leave a lasting mark on Israeli scholarship, mythology, and society. 
The aim of this paper is to study several aspects of the New Historians and the 
Critical Sociologists, and their impact on Israeli scholarship. For this purpose, the 
paper is divided into three chapters. 
The first chapter examines the emergence of the New Historians and Critical 
Sociologists. The term "new historians" was originally coined in a 1988 paper by 
Benny Morris to describe himself, Shlaim, Pappé, and Flapan. According to 
Morris there were two main reasons for the sudden interest in reexamining Israeli 
history. The first, "material" reason consisted of the opening of state archives and 
the availability of previously classified papers. The second reason was related to 
the historians themselves: they were all born around 1948, and were therefore, 
unlike previous historians, more critical towards Israeli history, especially in light 
of the 1982 Lebanon War
10
. However, the more attention the Critical Historians 
attracted the clearer it became that other factors also influenced their emergence. 
For one, the international academic climate during the 1970's-80's was especially 
ripe for self-critical and minority studies. Throughout the Western world (to 
which, academically at least, Israel adheres) this was the high tide of postmodern 
theories and multi-narrative histories. Israeli academics, highly influenced by 
western-European and American schools of thought, were eager to implement 
                                               
6
 Aronson, 2003, p. 381. 
7 Friling, 1992, p. 319. 
8 Gelber, 2003, p. 158. 
9 Gutwein, 2003, pp. 248-249. 
10 Morris, 2007, pp. 14-15. 
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international methodologies in their own immediate environment
11
. Another 
important factor was the social and political events which, as of 1967, pushed 
Israelis to "soul-search" their past, present, and future. A series of landmark events 
which followed the 1967 occupation of the Palestinian territories include:  
 the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; 
 the reawakening of the Palestinian national movement in the 1970s; 
 the 1977 fall of the traditional Socialist-Left-Ashkenazi Ma'arakh and 
the rise to power of the Right-wing Likud for the first time in Israeli 
history; 
 the 1982 Lebanon War; 
 and finally the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987. 
All these events both affected and reflected Israel's self-perception and self-
awareness
12
. As we shall see, the social and political climate in Israel, alongside 
rising academic trends during the late 1970's and the 1980's served as a hothouse 
for the emergence of these scholars. Thus, these critical scholars represented what 
many have termed a "maturing" process of Israeli society, which entailed a 
confrontation with Israel's less-heroic moments on the one hand
13
, and a rebellion 
against the established academia on the other. In many ways they reflected 
processes and transitions Israeli society itself was going through: disillusionment 
with past myths and conceptions; a reappraisal of Israel's part in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict; the gradual realization that Israel's founders were not without faults; and a 
cautious readjustment of Israel's political and social vision. Politically, this process 
was symbolized by the growing comprehension that Israel would have to reach 
some sort of understanding with its neighbors – a realization culminating in the 
1993 Oslo Accords led by the far from dovish Yitzhak Rabin. The Oslo Accords, 
in spite of the objections they raised with many parts of society, represented 
                                               
11 Ram, 2006, p. 247; Taub, 1997, p. 232. 
12 Kimmerling, 2001, p. 23; Ram, 1997, pp. 276-277. 
13 Friling, 2003. 
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Israel's maturation, acceptance of responsibility, and willingness to participate in 
creating a new regional reality. Socially, the process was felt through the 
increasing public discussion on ethnic and sectorial equality and discrimination in 
Israel. 
The second chapter explores the terminology employed by the critical scholars. 
A key characteristic of the Critical Historians was the use of either a neutral or 
negative terminology in describing Israeli history. Heroic, momentous, and 
subjective terminology, commonly used by mainstream scholars was solemnly 
rejected by the Critical Historians. The popular term alyia (ascent), which 
signified the Jews' return to their homeland, was replaced with hagira 
(immigration) or colonization; milhemet ha'atzmaut (the War of Independence) 
was now the First Arab-Israeli War, or the 1948 War; eretz Israel (the Land of 
Israel) was to become Palestine when referring to the same territory prior to 
Israel's declaration of independence
14
; simple Arabs were now Palestinians, and 
the Hebrew spelling of the word "Palestinian" proved to be a difficult, perplexing 
task, laden with positive or negative meaning. Other terms such as shlilat hagalut 
(the rejection of the Jews' existence outside Israel) and haiehudy ha'hadash (the 
new Jew) were shown to possess fascist influences, and to have heavily affected 
the Zionists' neglect of the European Jewry during the Holocaust
15
. The use of the 
new terminology was not merely a superficial change, but represented a greater 
aspiration, namely, to expose the myth of the Zionist project. With this new 
terminology the Critical Historians expressed their discontent with previous 
scholarship, and their desire to research Israeli history with critical, non-
sentimental tools, shedding national biases as much as they could and regardless 
(or, at times, in order to accelerate) of political and social consequences. 
The third chapter explores critical reactions to the emerging scholars. As the 
"old guard" of the Israeli historiography was blamed for embellishing and 
                                               
14 Bar-On, 2005, p. 64. 
15 Segev, 2001, p. 25 
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censoring Israeli history, renowned scholars such as Tuvia Friling, Anita Shapira, 
Yoav Gleber, and Shabtai Teveth found themselves compelled to defend their own 
research, on the one hand, and to counter attack the Critical Historians' works, on 
the other. Their criticism revolved around four main lines of argumentation: the 
Critical Historians interpreted events in retrospect and with knowledge that was 
not available to the Zionist (and later Israeli) leadership at the time; they 
intentionally falsified and used information out of context in order to vilify the 
leadership's motives; they misread sources and documents, and misunderstood the 
significance of events and the hierarchy of historical players
16
. The fourth line of 




The "clash of historians" which ensued also stirred a debate about Zionism and 
post-Zionism
18
. More than other points of contention, this debate quickly seeped 
to the media and popular discourse in Israel, diverting attention from historical 
facts and processes, and focusing instead on which narrative Israelis should 
espouse. Thus, the most significant widespread impact of the Critical Historians 
lay not in uncovering and discussing ambivalent moments in Israeli history, but in 
polarizing Israeli society, generating a process in which gradually any criticism of 
Israeli history or politics came to be associated with post- or anti-Zionism. Shortly, 
questions of political affinity and vision occupied the center stage, instead of 
historical and academic argumentation. 
Previous studies about the New Historians and Critical Sociologists largely 
focused on their claims and ideas with the intent to either support or refute them. 
In addition, they have commonly grouped together and focused on scholars with 
similar methodologies and political motives (or lack of) in order to reach an 
absolute "verdict" regarding these scholars. Thus, for example, some papers focus 
on Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, Avi Shlaim, and Simha Flapan, who were originally 
                                               
16 Friling, 2003a, pp. 426-427. 
17 Taub, 1997, pp. 233-234. 
18 Bar-On, 2005, p. 53. 
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dubbed the "New Historians" by Morris, in order to identify biographical and 
methodological similarities. Others have focused on postmodern writers such as 
Pappé, Uri Ram, and Adi Ophir in order to discuss the postmodern elements of 
these scholars
19
. In this paper I tried to assemble a comprehensive yet varied 
representation of Critical Historians. Thus the study is predominately based on the 
writings of Morris, Tom Segev, and Baruch Kimmerling, each of which represents 
a different "current" within the Critical Historians. 
In his seminal The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Morris studied the 
1948 War, and exposed expulsions and massacres committed by the Israelis. 
While most Israelis were under the impression the Israeli army was not 
responsible for the Palestinians' expulsion, Morris claimed both Israeli political 
and military leaderships played a central role in organizing and enabling the 
expulsions. The book was one of the first Critical Historiographies to be translated 
into Hebrew (most early works were written in English), and therefore the claims 
Morris raised concerning Israel's part in the refugee problem played a central part 
in the early part of the historians' debate. 
Segev focused on the impact of the Holocaust on the Jewish settlement in 
Mandatory Palestine, and Zionist reaction to the Holocaust. In his book The 
Seventh Million Segev criticized the Jewish settlements' actions and response to 
the Holocaust, claiming the Zionist leadership did not do enough when it could 
save lives, and later exploited the memory of the holocaust for political purposes. 
The book garnered both widespread success and criticism. One of the most critical 
papers on the book, The Zionist Movement's March of Folly by Tuvia Friling, 
criticized the book factually, but more importantly, considered the book a case 
study of the New Historiography, thereby "exposing" techniques and methods 
used by other critical writers
20
. 
                                               
19 Taub, 1997. 
20 Friling, 1992. 
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Baruch Kimmerling (1939-2007) was one of the most prominent sociologists in 
Israeli academy. Nearly ten years older than other Israeli Critical Historians and a 
former student of Eisenstadt, Kimmerling was publishing critical papers on Israeli 
history and society several years before the term New History was coined. In his 
books, Kimmerling focused on Zionist hegemony and its treatment of non-
hegemonic groups: Arabs, ultra-orthodox Jews, Holocaust survivors, and Jewish 
immigrants from Muslim countries (e.g. Morocco, Yemen, Iran, etc.). Kimmerling 
also wrote on colonialist aspects of Israel, a topic which was to dominate the 
Critical Historians' narrative. 
Alongside these writers, I will use papers by historians Pappé and Shlaim, and 
sociologists Ram and Gershon Shafir, as well as other scholars, in order to explore 
other aspects of critical writing, such as postmodernism, relativism, and multi-
culturalism. 
For this paper, I will use a comparative methodology. A comparative 
methodology will enable a wider examination of the critical thinkers, the 
differences and similarities in the uses of different terminology, criticism, and 
ideas. It will also facilitate the preparation of a more comprehensive, axial 
research, evaluating how different terms are used by different writers in one period 
of time, and how they evolve throughout time by specific writers. While initial 
response to the critical writers was vehemently antagonistic, over time some of 
their ideas gained widespread recognition and were, reluctantly, even accepted by 
"old" and "institutional" thinkers
21
. Thus the story of the emergence and 
development of the Critical Historians is not limited to a particular, closed group 
of scholars, but relates to the way Israel comes to understand and debate its history 
and identity. 
 
                                               
21 Bar-On, 2005, pp. 80-81. 
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2.1 Chapter 1: The Origins and Opinions of the Critical Historians 
The emergence of the Critical Historians in the 1980's, stirred Israeli public 
opinion into a heated discussion on the 1948 War, and the birth, as well as the 
future of Israel. This fiery discussion was long time in the making, and had its 
roots in historical, sociological, philosophical, and political happenings, some 
even preceding 1948. The Critical Historians were influenced differently by 
various occurrences and developments, some driven more by social changes, such 
as ethnic tensions between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews, others by "material" 
historical occurrences like the uncovering of classified documents in the 1980s, 
some by political conviction, rooted in the objection to Israeli policies in the 
Occupied Territories following 1967, and others by a combination of these factors. 
Before we set out to study and recount the processes which led to their 
formation, it is important to clarify at least one potential terminological issue. One 
of the confusing difficulties in discussing the Critical Historians is the common 
designation of the New Historians and the Critical Sociologists as post-Zionists. 
While the New Historiography and Critical Sociology describe mostly an 
academic approach, post-Zionism denotes a rather wide array of political 
convictions. Unfortunately, the terms New Historians, Critical Sociologists, and 
post-Zionists, are frequently used alternately, while in fact, different writers hold 
different opinions concerning Israel's present condition, and its desired future 
course
22
. The spectrum of opinions held by the Critical Historians includes self-
proclaimed post-Zionists (Segev, Kimmerling, and Ram), anti-Zionists (Pappé), 
non-Zionists (Shlomo Sand), and Zionists (Morris). With time, and responding to 
further developments in Israeli history (such as the failed Oslo peace talks, and the 
Second Intifada), some have radicalized their views (Pappé) bringing to question 
Israel's right to exist, some have retained their views (Segev, Kimmerling, Ram), 
supporting various forms of a multicultural society, and Benny Morris represents a 
unique case of disillusionment with post-Zionism, and consequently the support of 
                                               
22 Livneh, 2001. 
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a strong Israeli state, and the creation of a "joint West Bank–Gaza–Jordan state, 
ruled jointly by the Hashemites and the PNA" [Palestinian National Authority]
23
. 
In order to simplify and clarify this confusion, as well as separate academic works 
from political views, it will sometimes be necessary to emphasize and explore the 
differences in evolution and development between the Critical Historians 
concerning academic writing and methodology on the one hand and political 
persuasion on the other. 
In the paper's first chapter, I will explore the background and origin of the 
Critical Historians, through two main facets:  
1. The main events in Israeli history, politics and wars (1948-1988), and their 
influence on Israeli critical thinking; and, 
2. Social developments and transitions in Israeli society which, alongside 
philosophical and methodological developments that took place in Western 
European and North American academies (1967-1990s), generated the new 
academic generation of the Critical Historians. 
As we shall see, the Critical Historians were deeply influenced by a combination 
of internal Israeli affairs, such as the eroding of Mapai, the impact of the Six Day, 
Yom Kippur, and Lebanon wars, and the accessibility to previously censored 
documents, and external, mainly academic developments in philosophies and 
ideologies such as postcolonial studies and identity politics. 
 
2.2 Israeli history: Archives, Heroism, and Disappointment 
The historical events which spawned the emergence of the Critical Historians 
could be roughly divided into two main categories: the opening of the Israeli 
archives, and political and military clashes of Israel with the Arab states and 
Palestinian population. 
                                               
23 Morris, 2009, pp. 200-201. 
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In 1955 Israel passed the Archives Law (amended in 1964 and 1981) which 
entailed, alongside restrictions concerning sensitive documents, the 
declassification of state papers after thirty years (the "thirty-year rule"). 
Throughout the 1980s the Israeli government was in the process of declassifying 
"hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions" of papers
24
, from the years 1947-1956, 
including personal journals and correspondences, Foreign Ministry papers, official 
and non-official documents from the Defense Ministry, the IDF, the prime 
minister's office, and political party papers. These documents contained reports, 
testimonies, and proof of various cases of expulsion, massacres, rapes, and 
lootings, committed by the Israeli military, as well as the Israeli leadership's semi-
planned transfer of the Palestinian population. 
According to Morris, the "old" historians had predominantly based their 
writings on interviews and personal memoires of Israeli officers and politicians 
who had participated in the 1948 War, and therefore their research was extremely 
unbalanced. On the other hand, sources which could be used to balance, support, 
or refute personal recollections, were unavailable. The Critical Historians reached 
academic "maturity" just as these sensitive documents came to light. Having come 
across such a multitude of newly available documents, the Critical Historians 
preferred basing their research on "hard data", striving to establish themselves as 
professional scholars, and refrained from using oral history and other "soft" 
research methods. Their early research was highly factual, and tended to refrain 
from critical theorization which would become central in their later writings. 
Coming across previously unavailable resources of such importance, the Critical 
Historians saw themselves as no less than revolutionaries of Israeli historiography. 
Segev went so far as to term himself the "first" historian of early Israeli history
25
. 
According to Segev, before the New Historians, Israelis did not have a have a 
history, but a mythology, at best, as previous historians did not have the materials 
                                               
24 Morris, 2007, pp. 14-15. 
25 Segev, 1998, p. vii. 
20 
 
necessary for writing a proper history. More commonly, Segev argues, Israel had 
an ideology, plenty of indoctrination, but no proper history
26
. The term mythology 
was used profusely to symbolize the calling the Critical Historians felt they now 
had, i.e. the demythologization of Israeli history, and presentation of "what 
[actually] happened" in Israeli history
27
. 
In his seminal article The New Historiography Morris took the case study of the 
Lydda and Ramle massacre and expulsion in order to demonstrate how lack of 
resources enabled misleading depictions of historical events. Examining 
contemporary documents, Morris shows how a misunderstanding (under nerve 
wrecking conditions, admittedly) and not a rebellion, as previously believed, 
caused the Lydda massacre on July 11, 1948. Lydda, an Arab town, was occupied 
by Israeli forces on July 11
th
. While no official ceasefire had been signed between 
the Israelis and the residing Palestinians, the town was peaceful for the remainder 
of the night. The following day, led to believe they were being reinforced by the 
Transjordan army, armed locals began sniping at the Israeli forces. Soon the 
Transjordan forces retreated, however, without the knowledge of the local 
population which continued its resistance. In retaliation to the local population's 
fire, the four hundred Israeli soldiers situated in the village began firing 
haphazardly, massacring more than 250 Arabs
28
. Both Israeli and Arab historians 
claimed the Israelis' actions were a response to a rebellion of a much larger scale 
than had actually taken place: the Israelis in order to lessen their own blame, and 
the Arabs in order to emphasize their own bravery and tenacity. Following the 
shooting, official orders were given to expel the inhabitants of Lydda and 
neighboring Ramle. Israeli historians during the 1950s-1970s, Morris claimed, 
were "less than honest in their treatment of the Lydda-Ramle episode"
29
. Both 
official histories (such as IDF publications) and independent depictions (by ex-
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combatants directly or indirectly involved in the events), misrepresented the 
events, bluntly claiming or insinuating, that the Palestinian residents asked the IDF 
for permission to evacuate the towns (fearing Israeli retribution) which they were 
then given. According to Morris this was just one episode characteristic of many 
in which the events of the 1948 War were misrepresented to absolve the Jewish 
soldiers of atrocities and expulsions. On a large scale, this misrepresentation by 
historians and veterans led Israelis to believe they were not responsible for the 
birth of the Palestinian refugee problem. Until the Critical Historians published 
their research, most Israelis were under the impression that while Jewish soldiers 
fought heroically during the 1948 War, the Palestinians were encouraged by their 
leaders to evacuate their villages and towns for cynical political reasons. As the 




Some Critical Historians acknowledged the fact that even before the 
declassification of sources there were steps taken by some Israelis to present a 
more scientific and a less "mythologized" version of Israeli history. Morris, for 
example, noted Kimmerling's 1983 Zionism and Territory, and Ephraim Kleiman's 
Khirbet Khiz'ah and Other Unpleasant Memories, however, these and other 
attempts "all had suffered from the relative paucity of archival materials"
31
. 
Indeed, the Critical Sociologists, who emerged during the 1970s, nearly a decade 
before the New Historians, were not as influenced by the discovery of new 
archival material
32
. The Critical Sociologists were more influenced by social and 
ideological changes which will be discussed in the second section of this chapter. 
While Morris and Segev repeatedly emphasized document declassification as 
the key factor in the emergence of the New Historians, other historians and 
sociologists, not belittling the archives' importance (save for Ram's peculiar claim 
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that "the facts discovered in the historians' debate were known to everyone"
33
), 
gave greater importance to other processes and happenings in the Israeli State and 
society. 
In 1988, when the New Historians first caught public attention as revisionists of 
Israel's "pure" narrative 
34
, the State of Israel was 40 years old. In its forty years of 
existence, it had experienced six full scale wars, an Intifada, and one major 
political turnover. Each of these events, whether a passive reaction to "outside" 
factors, or a planned, calculated action, left its mark on Israeli public mentality, 
and self-perception. 
When the New Historians came to explain the historical-political events which 
influenced them, they most commonly referred to the Lebanon War and the First 
Intifada. However, some scholars have marked the 1967 Six Day War as the 
watershed of Israeli historiography. 
In spite of the general euphoric wave which took over Israel following the war's 
successful victory, the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and 
the Sinai Desert, also raised protest and objection by some Israelis. Alongside 
prominent figures such as philosopher Isaiah Leibowitz and Finance Minister 
Pinchas Sapir who objected to the settlement of the conquered territories and 
called for negotiations with the Arab countries, the first public movements were 
also born, protesting against the destruction of Palestinian villages
35
. Another 
result of the war was the renewed interest in earlier Zionist history. Israel no 
longer under existential threat, Israeli researchers now felt more comfortable 
researching sensitive topics, such as the Zionists reaction to the Holocaust and the 
Jews' relations with the Arab world. 
Before the Six Day War there existed one prevalent mainstream narrative, and 
several marginal critical narratives. The mainstream Israeli narrative maintained 
the Zionists had done all in their power in order to help the European Jews during 
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the Holocaust, on the one hand, and secure peaceful relations with the Arabs on 
the other. The marginal narratives were held by several opposition groups to the 
hegemonic Mapai, such as the ultra-orthodox Jews, the communists, the anti-
Zionist Bund, and in a different manner by the nationalist Likud. These groups 
accused the Mapai establishment of having failed, or rather not having tried to 
solve these burning problems. The accusations against the Mapai establishment 
were plentiful: it neglected the European Jews during the Holocaust, and 
attempted to save only those who seemed able to benefit the Zionist settlement in 
Palestine, abandoning physically unfit Jews, on the one hand, and opponents of 
Zionism on the other; it did not attempt to create true coexistence with the Arabs, 
and had betrayed Zionism's universal-socialist origin in favor of nationalism; it 
had mistreated the new immigrants, especially those from Muslim countries and 
Holocaust survivors; it mistreated the ultra-orthodox and the Palestinian minority 
out of arrogance, etc. Following the war, these accusations slowly began to 
reemerge, however, now they also began to preoccupy academic researchers
36
. 
Another effect of the Six Day War was the consolidation of the religious right 
wing and its expansionist vision. As the religious right wing was gaining 
widespread support, it began using mainstream Zionist symbols and agendas, 
which previously belonged to the center-left. In essence, following the Six Day 
War the Israeli left saw its values and symbols now representing right-wing 
expansionism, but while the traditional left sought to redefine its purpose and 
ideals within a national agenda, a radical sub current gradually began to emerge, 
alienating itself from Zionism altogether
37
. 
While the Six Day War epitomized the climax of Israeli euphoria and optimism, 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War marked a major turning point in Israeli morale and 
self-awareness. Ill prepared for the war, the Israeli army suffered major losses 
which gravely shook Israeli society for the first time. Nationwide protests and 
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public outcry produced the Agranat Commission and the dispersal of the wartime 
government, led by the socialist Mapai party which had been in power since the 
formation of Israel. The war's traumatic effect led the Israeli public to mistrust 
Mapai's competences, and its ability to secure Israel's existence in the Middle 
East. This disenchantment was corroborated in the political turnover of 1977, in 
which the nationalist Likud, headed by Menachem Begin, won the elections for the 
first time. The defeat of Mapai in many ways symbolized the crumbling of the 
Ashkenazi social elite, which Kimmerling termed AHUSALIM, (an acronym 
standing for Ashkenazi, secular, veteran, socialist, and nationalist
38
), the collapse 
of hegemonic forces, and the rise of rivaling groups, critical of mainstream 
Zionism
39
. The weakening of the fifty-year-old established labor party led, in turn, 
to the emergence of the Critical Sociologists, as they termed themselves in 
opposition to Establishment Sociologists. According to Ram, the source of the 
differences between the Critical and the Establishment sociologists is their attitude 
towards the present: while Establishment Sociology is interested in preserving the 
present and existing social reality, Critical Sociology is interested in changing the 
present, its methodology is an "analysis of the whole and its inner oppositions, and 
its theory is the effort to expose the emerging or the possible"
40
. While 
Establishment Sociology presents itself as objective and independent of external 
factors, Critical Sociology declares its commitment to values of equality and 
freedom. 
The third turning point in Israeli history came in the form of the 1982 Lebanon 
War, along with the "triple-digit inflation […] two sources of instability" in Israeli 
society
41
. While previous Israeli wars were described as "no-choice" wars, 
threatening the entire existence of the Israeli State, the Lebanon War was the first 
designated as a calculated war meant to serve strategic purposes. This difference 
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in terminology, as well as the war's unexpected extension and feeling it had 
reached an impasse, led to a general demoralization in Israeli society. In spite of 
the pessimistic atmosphere caused by the war and the inflation, the 1980's also 
brought along a feeling of potential change. Slowly being freed from past political 
and social restraints, a nationwide poll revealed people were feeling "personally 
happy", in spite of showing a growing concern over the State of Israel
42
. Thus the 
Critical Historians began publishing their studies at a time when Israeli society 
was disillusioned with some of its early mythologies on the one hand, but was 
harboring cautious optimism on the other. 
The final historical event to have influenced the emerging Critical Historians 
was the First Intifada which broke out in 1987. Unlike past Palestinian terror 
attacks which were organized by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the 
intifada was a spontaneous popular uprising. The Palestinians revolted as a 
unanimous body, regardless of age, sex, or social background. As opposed to 
organized terrorism, the symbolic weapons of the intifada were "the stone and, 
occasionally, the Molotov cocktail and knife" – not guns and bombs
43
. For the first 
time it seemed that no amount of military violence could stop the Palestinians' 
demand for their own state, and the Israeli public turned against the rigid Likud 
government headed by Yitzhak Shamir. The First Intifada, thus made Israel 
question its policies and seek a way out of what seemed an endless bloody cycle. 
Morris himself served time in the military prison, after refusing reserve duty in the 
occupied territories, and described the prevalent reaction among the New 
Historians towards the First Intifada: "I saw the first intifada […] as an effort of a 
people to throw off a 20-year military occupation. This effort, in the main, was not 
lethal, and the protesters did not use live-fire weapons. They'd simply had enough; 
they wanted to be rid of the yoke of occupation − that is how I saw it. I did not feel 
it right to take part in the suppression of this nonlethal uprising, and I refused to do 
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reserve duty in the Nablus Casbah. I felt that the Palestinian struggle for 
independence was legitimate and that the oppression was fundamentally 
illegitimate."
44
 In light of these events, a steadily growing part of the Israeli 
population was feeling a "discomfort" with Israel's official national memory
45
. By 
1988 the first major critical historiographies had been published, gaining both 
critical acclaim and harsh criticism. Soon, the heated debate about post-Zionism 
reached the media, bringing questions concerning Israel's past and future course to 
the forefront of public interest. 
 
2.3 Sociology and the "post" philosophies 
The second primary source for the emergence of the Critical Historians was a 
combination of social transitions taking place in Israel, and the way these 
transitions affected, and were affected in return, by European and North American 
philosophical trends. These changes and evolutions took place not only within 
Israeli society, but also among Israeli scholars and academics, and in essence they 
constitute the advent of post-Zionism as an evolutionary stage in Israeli society on 
the one hand, and as a philosophical and political vision on the other. 
While not all Israeli historians and sociologists agree on the importance of the 
various social and philosophical variables to the emergence of the Critical 
Historians, it is widely accepted that these scholars consisted of a new generation 
in the Israeli academy, which corresponded to a new state of mind prevalent 
within Israeli society. In order to examine these transitions it is important to study 
the role of the universities in the earlier years of the Israeli State and their 
development against the background of social transitions in Israel on the one hand, 
and Western academic trends on the other. In other words, as Ram suggests, both 
the "old" and "new" histories are deeply rooted in Israel's national memory, and 
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reflect – either as a cause or an effect – pervasive transitions in Israeli society
46
. In 
this section I will explore Kimmerling's and Ram's sociological accounts as 
representing the critical approach, Gelber's and Shapira's as representing the "old" 
school understanding of the Critical Sociologists, Daniel Gutwein's unique account 
of Israeli economic and academic privatization, and finally I will assess and 
criticize different aspects of these accounts. 
Hegemony, as understood by Gramsci, is one of the most debated terms in the 
Israeli historians' and sociologists' debate, and will be studied comprehensively in 
the second and third chapters of the paper. However, there is general agreement 
among both the "old" historians and sociologists and the Critical Historians that 
Israeli society and politics underwent a major change from a more or less united, 
or monolithic, society, to a diverse and pluralistic one. This transition took place 
not only in Israeli society, but was evident also in Israeli politics, economy and 
academy. The main Israeli universities (in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the 
Negev) were formed during the earlier stages of building the Israeli State, and 
their formation was part of the "construction of the nation, society, culture, 
economy, armed forces, and public bureaucracy"
47
. Therefore, and as is common 
among young, emerging states, Israeli historians and sociologists closely 
cooperated with the state, and took it upon themselves to support the new state by 
presenting a positive, heroic, and "pure" history of the nation. In their analysis of 
the history of the Israeli academia, the Critical Historians frequently attack the 
willful cooperation of the "old" academics with the hegemonic ruling Mapai party. 
As we have seen earlier, both Segev and Morris considered themselves and the 
New Historians the first Israeli historians, discarding the former as ideologues and 
apologists. One of the main reasons for the emergence of the Critical Historians, 
they asserted, was the universities in which the scholars completed their studies. 
As Segev noted in his English preface to The First Israelis, most of the Critical 
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Historians completed at least some part of their studies abroad – mostly in 
American and British universities – during the late 1970s and early 1980s, where 
"one of the most crucial lessons they brought home was the importance of 
challenging and criticizing accepted truths"
48
. Morris also briefly considered this 
idea when attacking, many years later, Pappé's books and harsh criticism towards 
Israel, discussing Pappé's studies at Oxford, and the influence his supervisor, 
Albert Hourani, might have had on his materializing views
49
. Thus, they conferred 
a significant part in their own development to their studying in foreign 
universities, associating geography with ideology and methodology, and granting 
more importance to external influences on their development. 
Kimmerling and Ram offer a more detailed analysis of the "old" Israeli 
academics and the processes which led to the emergence of the new generation. 
Focusing more on internal transitions and changes, they seek to explain why 
Israeli academics internalized these theories so enthusiastically. 
According to Kimmerling, the Israeli academies were created inseparably of the 
Zionist establishment. The dominant founders of Israeli sociology, especially in 
the Jerusalem Hebrew University, Israel Eisenstadt, Jacob Talmon, and Joseph 
Ben-David as well as other key figures in the early Israeli academy, came from 
East-Europe, and were deeply committed not only to the Zionist project, but also 
to Mapai
50
. Encountering problematic subjects or sensitive issues, the "old" 
historians and sociologists would consider the grand Zionist project at hand, and 
discard those issues in favor of a positive, embellishing account of the state. While 
ignoring or "retouching" problematic issues is a common phenomenon in many 
national historiographies, in Israel the anxiety concerning Israel's future existence 
and ability to sustain itself intensified the need to "mythologize" its history
51
. The 
founding sociologists laid down rigid framework decisions concerning 
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sociological research, such as terminology, periodization, and sociopolitical 
boundaries, which having been harnessed to the nation's state building, and by 
deploying Zionist conceptions, disabled significant self-criticism
52
. Thus, the 
Israeli academy was saturated with value-laden terms such as alyia (literally 
"ascent", but also meaning immigration to Israel) as opposed to yerida (literally 
"descent", and denoting emigration from Israel), and eretz israel when referring to 
Ottoman-ruled- or British Mandate Palestine. Through periodization, historians 
and sociologists focused on the Zionists' activities leading to the formation of the 
Israeli State, thus creating a directional, deterministic history, on the one hand, and 
relegating the Palestinians to the level of "supporting characters" in the Israeli 
story on the other. According to Kimmerling, "[a]ny sociologist who attempted to 
deploy new approaches confronted established framework decisions"
53
. 
The diversification of Israeli sociology first took place through the proliferation 
of universities in Israel during the 1970s, and the emergence of a new generation 
of sociologists with Marxist orientation in Haifa University, who positioned 
themselves in opposition to the dominant "Jerusalem Sociology". The erosion of 
Israeli hegemony started after the Six Day War, as Israeli society was becoming 
polarized in relation to the question of the occupied territories. The first dissenting 
group was the "religious Zionists" who called for an official annexation and 
immediate inhabiting of the territories. In opposition, radical leftist groups also 
started emerging, urging the government to relinquish the territories and seek 
peace with the surrounding Arab countries. Both groups were represented in the 
academy. The first radical leftist sociologists, were comprised of both Jews and 
Palestinians, associated themselves with the New Left, and analyzed Zionism 
through the colonial perspective. However, these sociologists, who soon became 
anti-Zionists and left Israel, tended to blend political views and social analysis, 
thus attracting limited attention in Israel. Nonetheless, they pioneered critical 
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sociology in Israel, and were soon followed by other sociologists in methodology 
and terminology
54
. The disintegration of Israeli hegemony gained pace, giving rise 
to more and more nonconformist groups within Israeli society, reflected in turn in 
the proliferation of sociological currents who opposed the previously established 
sociologists. 
According to Ram, early Israeli academic writing was in many cases auxiliary 
to "ideological writing, not to say propaganda – always undeclared, sometimes 
without awareness, usually while giving the product a scientific appearance"
55
. 
Ram disagrees with Morris' assertion that the main reasons for the development of 
the New Historians were archive accessibility and academic generation changes. 
Contrarily, Ram sees the emergence of critical academics as a result of a 
widespread "discomfort" with the official Israeli national memory. This 
"discomfort" was initially a popular, that is non-academic, feeling, which was 
reflected in academic works only at a much later stage. Ram associates the 
emergence of the Critical Historians with post-Zionism, which he understands as a 
byproduct of postmodernism, and the advent of multiculturalism in Israel. Ram 
maintains that Israeli society began its process of pluralization in the 1970s, with 
two main alternative movements to the official hegemonic Zionist identity: neo-
Zionism, and post-Zionism. While neo-Zionism manifested a religious revival and 
a messianic, expansionist attitude, post-Zionism emphasized the "individual's right 
against collective loyalty, normality against exceptionalism, and the present 
against the past"
56
. Both neo- and post-Zionism began as popular reactions to the 
ongoing occupation, and were epitomized respectively in the Gush emunim (the 
settlers') and Yesh gvul (conscientious objectors') movements. Post-Zionism, 
unlike orthodox and neo-Zionism is a pluralistic movement, which does not favor 
one narrative, but rather supports the multiplicity of narratives as a cultural 
principle for securing democracy. Therefore, the historians' debate is not a result 
                                               
54 Ibid., 1992, p. 456. 
55 Ram, 1997, p. 283. 
56 Ibid., 1997, p. 284. 
31 
 
of generational change, but is rather the consequence of the creation of new 
narratives, and the preference of alternative narratives and identities to the Zionist 
one. The transition from growing collective consciousness to articulated academic 
discourse took place during the 1970s and 1980s, when Western European and 
North American postmodernism was implemented in the Israeli academia. 
According to Ram, what Morris and Segev consider a mere archival "coincidence" 
was in fact the expected attraction of Israeli scholars to contemporary academic 
trends. 
The main weakness of Ram's narrative is that the Critical Historians used, at 
least in their beginnings, predominately positivistic, modern methodologies. 
Among the historians, Flapan was the only one to have used an explicitly Marxist 
and ideological paradigm in his Birth of Israel, until Pappé proclaimed himself a 
postmodern historian in 1996, and called for a "new agenda for the 'new 
history'"
57
. Nonetheless, Pappé's own subsequent research did not comply with the 
new postmodern agenda he advanced, as his research remained positivistic in 
essence. Among the critical sociologists postmodernism is more prevalent, 
especially in identity politics and postcolonial theories, as can be found in 
Kimmerling's writing, to cite one example, and more significantly in the anthology 
Israeli Society, edited by Ram, which explores women's, ethnic, class, and 
militaristic narratives. Methodologically however, postmodernism had a weaker 
effect on Israeli sociology, as relativism is relatively sparse, and most researchers 
establish their findings on outwardly objective, positivistic research. 
"Old" historians and "establishment" sociologists have naturally disowned these 
historical accounts. Notwithstanding the lack of available sources, they claim 
earlier Israeli historians and sociologists, such as Eisenstadt, Israel Kolatt, and 
Talmon were balanced and objective, and did not hesitate to confront David Ben-
Gurion and the establishment
58
. 
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In opposition to the dichotomous "old" and "new" histories, Gelber has offered 
a periodization of four generations of historians: the first generation consisted of 
Zionists turned historians. Writing in Mandatory Palestine, these early historians 
were not professional historians, and their writing was apologetic, aimed to justify 
Zionism and the formation of the Israeli State before anti-Zionist Jews
59
. The 
second generation, active during the first decade of the Israeli State, focused on 
the Jewish settlement in pre-Israeli Palestine (the yishuv), and considered recent 
events, such as the 1948 War, too contemporaneous to deserve a historical 
account
60
. The third generation, which began writing during the 1960s, was the 
first to use critical, academic tools in researching Zionism and Israel. Not only was 
their research, unlike what the New Historians claim, professional and objective, 
but it was still being written in Israel, by non-politically-committed scholars
61
. 
According to Gelber, the New Historians are in fact the fourth generation of Israeli 
historians, and are more similar to the first generation of historians, being 
ideologically committed in their research, unlike the second and third generations. 
Their criticism towards the third generation is the product of their political and 
ideological commitment, not the third generation's "betrayal" of the truth
62
. In 
spite of Gelber's insightful division to four periods of historians, he explains the 
New Historians' emergence only by their studies in foreign universities and their 
overenthusiasm towards Political Correctness
63
. In Gelber's account, the Critical 
Historians are "fashion victims" at best and political opportunists at worst. 
Anita Shapira, a prominent "old" historian, has offered a less disparaging 
analysis of the origins of the Critical Historians, but also a less systematic one. 
Shapira recognizes the political differences and nuances between the historians, 
but finds they all share a distrustful attitude towards the State of Israel, and that 
                                               
59
 Gelber, 1997, p. 68. 
60 Ibid., p. 75. 
61 Ibid., p. 77. 
62 Ibid., p. 84. 
63 Ibid., p. 85. 
33 
 
most of them use historical criticism as a point of departure for offering a political 
program for the future
64
.  
Sociologically, Shapira observes most of them were born after 1948, and thus 
have matured academically during the 1980s and the 1990s. According to Shapira, 
this sociological aspect played a major role in their emergence. The Critical 
Historians examined Israeli history without the awe and admiration which was 
characteristic of previous historians, who had participated to some extent – either 
as passive witnesses, or actively in combat and decision making – in the 1948 
War
65
. They did not experience the fear and excitement of the 1948 War, did not 
see their friends and comrades die in the war, and therefore were not impressed by 
Israel's victory. The Critical Historians, who learned about the war from 
documents and statistics, saw the victory simply as a matter of Israel's superior 
military strength. Accordingly, they were more impressed by the 750,000 
Palestinian refugees, than they were by the 6,000 fallen Israelis, who accounted 
for 1% of the Jews in Israel at the time
66
. They saw Israel as a country like any 
other, with just as many strengths and weaknesses, and did not feel compelled to 
suppress or ignore these weaknesses in their research. However, Shapira claims, 
beyond reexamining Israeli history, the Critical Historians sought to modify Israeli 
collective memory. In point of fact, many of the Critical Historians' "discoveries", 
such as Israeli military superiority in the second part of the 1948 War, were 
common knowledge within the Israeli academia
67
. The mythologized memory of 
the 1948 War, best exemplified in the perception of the Jewish "David" fighting 
against the Arab "Goliath", was a result of school textbooks, media coverages, and 
commemoration projects. The Critical Historians emphasized such unheroic facts 
alongside the Palestinians' misfortunes, which were less known before the opening 
of the archives. The fight over collective memory, however, did not take place 
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within the academy, but exploded in full force in the media. What differentiated 
most the Critical from "older" historians was not so much archive availability, as 
political and social agendas, and the attempt to influence Israeli society. Centering 
her argumentation on generational "rebellion", Shapira optimistically deliberated 
on how the generation following the Critical Historians will rebel against them, 
and possibly, might return to a more balanced view of Israeli history
68
. 
Daniel Gutwein offers an unusual explanation for the emergence of the Critical 
Historians. Gutwein starts his analysis by claiming the Critical Historians did not 
offer a new criticism towards Israeli collective memory, but on the contrary, they 
were merely recycling critical claims raised against the Israeli establishment by 
Zionist as well as non-Zionist oppositions, prevalent during the 1950s-1960s
69
. 
The difference between the early and the new critics was predominantly material, 
and lay in the Critical Historians' access to more data to support their claims. 
Accusations of colonialism were previously raised by Maki (the Israeli Communist 
Party) and its leader, Moshe Sneh. Mythological representations of the 1948 War 
were already challenged by Israel Bar, a former journalist deeply involved in the 
Israeli military establishment, discovered later to have been a Soviet spy
70
. 
Accusations of Mapai's treatment of the European Jews during and after the 
Holocaust were regularly raised by Begin, the dominant opposition leader. The 
main difference between the old and the new critics was that while the old critics 
were proclaimed politicians and ideologists, the Critical Historians presented 
themselves, at least initially, as objective, non-ideological researchers. What 
interests Gutwein are not so much the psychological backgrounds and political 
motives of the Critical Historians, as the reason their researches and ideas were so 
widely accepted and discussed, unlike their predecessors
71
. Therefore, his research 
focuses on transitions in Israeli society slightly before and during the eruption of 
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the historians' debate, and not on the particular reasons which led the Critical 
Historians to conduct their researches. In a way, Gutwein considers the Critical 
Historians mere "tools", conscious and at times unconscious, of change, used by 
elements of the establishment to promote the "privatization of memory"
72
. 
Gutwein recognizes four "agents" who promoted the Critical Historians and 
enabled them to have such an impact on Israeli society, in spite of the usual 
marginality of academic historians, and what he considers the abundance of 
defects in their research: the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Hakibbutz Hameukhad 
publishing house, Haaretz newspaper, and the universities
73
. According to 
Gutwein, these institutions are part of the main Israeli establishment, or old 
hegemony. The reason they endorsed the Critical Historians was not because they 
sought to exchange one official narrative with another, but because they were 
promoting a general privatization within the State of Israel. While privatization 
was already under way in the economic sector as of 1977, these agents were 
pushing for privatization in other sectors as well: social, political, cultural, 
juridical, etc. Israeli national memory was one of the most hegemonic, 
consolidated areas in Israeli society, while forces within the Israeli establishment 
were promoting general privatization as the new Israeli hegemony
74
. Gutwein 
analyzes two statements by Segev and Ram shortly before and during the Second 
Intifada, in which they associate post-Zionism with globalization processes. 
Gutwein claims that Segev and Ram understand post-Zionism as a reaction to 
external globalization processes – "similar to the way the acceptance of the post-
Zionist ethos was a result of globalization, with the peace and economic growth it 
entails, so did the security threat and the economic downturn caused by the 
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[Second] Intifada brought a retreat from it"
75
. However, Gutwein claims, post-
Zionism was first and foremost a result of internal conflicts and trends, largely 
unaffected by external factors. As mainstream Israeli politics was abandoning its 
socialist roots and adopting a free market capitalist approach, it was pushing for 
the privatization of all public sectors: memory and identity alike. 
These social and philosophical accounts of the emergence of the Critical 
Historians, along with the historical factors studied in the previous section, are 
those generally accepted by Israeli academics: archive availability and the First 
Lebanon War by all, Ram's and Kimmerling's by critical sociologists, and Gelber's 
by "old" historians. While Gelber's explanation might explain the lack of critical 
writing before the fourth generation, it fails to explain why this generation 
emerged, shortly mentioning their studies in foreign universities and their 
exposure to political correctness as the key factor. Shapira's analysis is also 
somewhat limited in this area. Typical of "establishment" scholars, both Gelber 
and Shapira ignore broader transitions which took place in Israeli society, and 
limit their analysis to inter-academic feuds. However, there is something lacking 
in discussing the development of the Critical Historians without considering 
processes and transitions which took place in Israeli society. Gelber's and 
Shapira's explanations identify external processes, such as the influence of foreign 
academies and academic trends, but fail to explore their deeper meanings and 
drives, why they were so eagerly adopted and implemented in Israel, and more 
significantly, why Israeli "lay" opinion was so receptive to these ideas. The 
polarization of Israeli society following the Six Day War, and the erosion of the 
prestige of the socialist Mapai were demonstrated in almost all areas of Israelis 
society, most significantly in the crucial 1977 mahapakh (the "turnover") in which 
the right wing Likud won the elections for the first time in Israeli history. It is 
lacking in scope to ignore these social events and transitions which were reflected 
in the emergence of popular political movements as well as new political parties, 
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radically critical cultural works, such as Hanoch Levin's controversial satires, and 
other events which expressed the destabilization of Israeli society. Evidently 
Israeli academics felt the need to respond to these happenings, and felt encouraged 
to criticize Israeli history and society through the prism of new and fashionable 
theories, themselves indicative of similar universally widespread feelings.  
However, adoption of postmodern and postcolonial theories was not as 
extensive as postmodern thinkers, such as Ram and Ophir have claimed. Unlike 
Ram's analysis, substantial use of postmodern methods and theories did not gain 
currency in Israel until the mid-1990s (with the exception of postcolonial 
theories). Early Critical Histories were not as radical as later works from the late 
1990s and early 2000s would come to be, and from today's perspective seem rather 
harmless. The tremor caused by their discoveries and ideas at the time, testifies to 
the lack of previous critical historical and sociological accounts. Another reason 
for their apparent moderation today might stem from the fact that many of their 
discoveries and ideas were subsequently, after the initial havoc they had raised, 
accepted in Israeli mainstream society, mainly by being incorporated into Israeli 
school textbooks. 
Gutwein's unusual account might indeed be instrumental in explaining the 
extensive exposure the Critical Historians received, and the question of the Critical 
Historians' influence on non-academic readers is rarely researched. It is also 
evident that Haaretz, one of the leading newspapers in Israel, dedicated profuse 
attention to the historians' debate and the Critical Historians' claims. However, the 
conspiratorial quality of the claim that the scholars were mere instruments of 
change remains unconvincing. As was suggested before, critical approaches and 
methodologies were a prevalent in Western academies at the time, therefore their 
international emergence must imply a universal privatization plan. Moreover, most 
of the Critical Historian' associated themselves with leftist, sometimes socialist 
political and economic agendas, if not downright Marxist or neo-Marxist. Segev 
and Kimmerling's criticism towards the establishment's assimilation of the 
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Palestinians, the ultra-orthodox, and the immigrants arises mainly from the 
establishment's condescension and homogenization attempts, not from an overly 
generous welfare policy. In fact, the Critical Historians' or rather the post-Zionists' 
story, has a rather ironical end. Until the Second Intifada, which erupted in 2001, 
many post-Zionists, such as Kimmerling, Ram, and Segev were highly optimistic 
concerning the disintegration of mainstream Zionism. They believed the 
acknowledgement of multiple narratives would generate a new, tolerant, 
harmonious, and mutually-supportive society. The bitter irony is that following the 
Second Intifada, Israeli society became more polarized than ever before, with each 
identity group supporting its own ends, and opposing, if not downright attacking, 
other sectors and groups. The current privatized, hostile Israeli society, was not the 
post-Zionists' aim. In a way it could be suggested that the weakness of their vision 
was envisioning individualism, group pride, and coexistence, while ignoring the 
emerging reality of alienation, group chauvinism, and mutual suspicion. 
3.1 Chapter 2: Terminology: Demythologizing Israeli myths 
The Critical Historians criticized not only what they considered the "old" 
historians' lack of objectivity and professionality, but even more their part in 
"mythologizing" Israeli history
76
. This mythologization, they argued, was 
accomplished not only by constructing a unique narrative and depicting specific 
events, such as the heroism and exceptional morality of the Israeli soldiers, or the 
peaceful endeavors of the Zionist leaders before and during the 1948 War, but 
moreover, by using a specific terminology, the choice of which justified a-priori 
the Zionist cause
77
. Thus, by using the terms eretz Israel (land of Israel) when 
describing Palestine under Ottoman, and later British rule, the geographical entity 
was depicted as belonging to the Jewish people throughout history. The term alyia 
("ascent") conveys Jewish immigration to Palestine/Israel in a positive way, unlike 
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yerida ("descent") which carries a negative undertone to emigration from it. On 
the other hand, the Arabs' and Palestinians' rebellions against the British mandate 
and the Jewish settlement were called meora'ot (literally "events"), ignoring the 
causes which led to these rebellions
78
. These were just a few examples of how 
Israeli history acquired a mythological quality, connecting contemporary Zionists 
all the way to the biblical Hebrews, thereby establishing the Jews' moral and 
rightful claim to the State of Israel – both in territory, and in statehood. 
In order to oppose this subjective historical description, revising historical and 
sociological terminology was one of the main tasks the Critical Historians took 
upon themselves. Consequently, the Critical Historians replaced positive 
terminology with neutral or outright negative terminology: what was previously 
called the War of Independence, was substituted for the 1948 War, or the First 
Arab-Israeli War; instead of alyia, Jews merely immigrated to Israel, or otherwise 
they colonized it; the meora'ot were now Arab rebellions; eretz Israel became 
Palestine; the generic term Arabs was replaced with Palestinians, etc.
79
. 
However, revising terminology meant more than just a semantic change. Other 
terms were criticized for their destructive implication on Jewish and Zionist 
history. "The negation of the diaspora", for example, which designated Israel as 
the only home for the Jews, caused the Zionist settlement to largely ignore the 
distress of the European Jews before and during the Holocaust
80
. One of the 
Zionists' aims, the creation of "the new Jew" on the other hand, which signified the 
revival of Jewish identity and nationhood, possessed fascist roots, and brought 
along feelings of indifference and contempt towards the European Jews by the 
Jewish settlement in Palestine
81
. 
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Finally, some terms, especially colonization and hegemony, pushed for new and 
extended research on Zionism as colonialism
82
, and the privileged hegemonic 
Mapai party and its exclusion of non-hegemonic and minority identities
83
. 
In this chapter, I will explore key terms that were revised by the Critical 
Historians, and the significance of their new representation in depicting Israeli 
history. These key terms are: immigration/colonization; hegemony and elite, 
negation of the diaspora and the new Jew; and finally the term Palestinians. As we 
shall see, the adoption of new terminology did not only create a seemingly 
"objective" historiography, but the use of the new terminology created new 
research possibilities in Israeli historiography, which in many cases became 
fundamentally hostile not only to some episodes in Zionist history, but to the 
Zionist project in its entirety. 
 
3.2 Zionism as Colonialism 
As mentioned in the first chapter, critical Israeli scholars were significantly 
influenced by the emergence of postcolonial studies in Western European and 
Northern American universities. The first attempts to research Zionism through 
the colonialist perspective took place already in the 1970s. However, these early 
postcolonial studies focused on Israel's colonizing attempts following the Six Day 
War, and not on earlier Zionist efforts
84
, notwithstanding the fact that their 
influence on Israeli public discourse as well as on Israeli academic research was 
limited
85
. Nonetheless, the late 1980s saw a renewed interest in the relations 
between Zionism and colonialism, which not only identified colonial aspects in 
early Zionism, but has also endured to this day. In this section I will analyze 
general aspects of the "Zionism as colonialism" paradigm, as well as specific 
interpretations of this paradigm by Critical Historians. 
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At first glance, the similarity between the Zionist movement and other 
European ideological-colonial movements is self-evident: the Zionist movement 
was formed by white European men during the 19
th
 century, and like previous 
religious, national, and expansionist movements, such as the Basel Mission, 
sought religious revival in Palestine
86
. Initial attempts by the Zionists to rely on 
their own labor and resources proved futile, and they began seeking help through 
overseas donations
87
. In addition, their early infatuation with and admiration of the 
indigenous' way of life quickly gave way to embittered hostility. Consequently the 
Zionists began to condescend and exploit the indigenous population, while 
robbing it of its land and resources
88
. Finally, the survival of the Zionist 
settlement, and the formation of the State of Israel would not have been possible 
without the support of the British Empire, which allied with the World Zionist 
Organization, and "which both opened up and secured the country to Jewish 
immigration and land purchase
89
. As is evident, while not all proponents of 
"colonialist Zionism" are outspokenly political, this methodology is more prone to 
political criticism of Zionism than other historiographical narrative, even among 
the Critical Historians, especially because it traces the "sins" of the Zionist 
movement back to 1882, and not to the 1948 War. Postcolonial theories inherently 
share some common factors such as the division of society into exploiting, 
excluding colonizers against exploited and repressed indigenous victims, as well 
as the colonizers' condescending view of the natives, which in the Middle Eastern 
context is associate with Said's "orientalism". Proponents of "colonialist Zionism" 
frequently claim that Zionist colonization was the main trigger to Arab and 
Palestinian hostility towards the Zionists, and that consequently the postcolonial 
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Nonetheless, the uniqueness of the Zionist movement against other colonialist 
movements is undeniable. To name just a few: the Zionists were a national 
movement, and actually sought to secularize biblical symbols, unlike the Basel 
Mission or the puritan colonization of North America; the Zionists were not an 
extension of a country or a church, therefore they did not exploit the land's 
resources for an overseas base, nor did they receive organized and stable support 
from an administrative body; and finally, unlike other colonial movements who 
were predominantly "pulled" to distant colonies, the Zionists were equally 
"pushed" from Europe by the pogroms in East Europe and rising Antisemitism
91
. 
In face of these disparities, supporters of colonialist interpretations of Zionism 
have had to justify the "colonialist Zionism" narrative, and consequently there are 
several postcolonial theories concerning the Zionist movement. One of the main 
methods of constructing a colonialist narrative of Zionism, is finding a historical 
"parallel" of the Zionist movement, such as the Basel Mission or the American 
Puritans, and pointing out similarities in various colonial aspects, such as motives 
for colonizing, methods of expansion, external supporters of colonization, the 
relations between the colonizers and the indigenous, etc. Thus, Pappé recognized 
similarities between the Zionists and the idealist-agrarian Basel Mission which 
attempted to create a colony in Palestine
92
. Pappé finds similarities between the 
movements mainly in terms of discourse (the "return" to the promised land); 
symbolism (the "ideal village"); historical context (both phenomena took place 
against the background of rural industrialization); education (hostility towards 
Islam); gradual corrosion of ideals, etc.
93
. Pappé does mention some differences 
between the movements, mainly the Zionists' dependence on British goodwill in 
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establishing a state, and the ultimate goal of the settlements (the mission did not 
aspire for the immigration of all Christians, nor did it consider industrialization), 
but these are mentioned briefly, and as insignificant. Similar approaches were 
taken by Shlomo Sand, who found links between Zionism and the Spanish 
Conquistadors in Latin America, and Kimmerling and Ram, who found links to 
the Puritan colonization in North America
94
. 
Gershon Shafir, one of the earliest sociologists to have used the postcolonial 
prism, linked Zionism to European colonialism by identifying different types of 
European colonialism, and evaluating the similarities and differences between 
Zionism and the various colonial types. Following categorizations by researchers 
D. K. Fieldhouse and George Fredrickson, Shafir recognizes four main types of 
colonies: occupation; mixed; plantation; and pure settlement
95
. Shafir claims 
Zionism is a mixture of plantation and pure settlement colony, notwithstanding 
specific characteristics it developed over the course of time. Both these types 
represent colonies in which Europeans colonized territories for the purpose of 
inhabitance and exploitation of resources and land. The plantation colony is 
characteristic of the cotton areas in the south of the United States, where black 
slaves were imported from Africa for labor, while the pure settlement colony is 
characteristic of the north of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, where 
the colonizers either deported or annihilated the local population, and both 
employers and employees belonged to the same ethnicity. The Zionists, Shafir 
argues, had to decide whether they wanted to create a plantation colony, in which 
the Arabs would be delegated to a lower "caste" of workers and citizens, or 




At an early stage of his analysis, Shafir recognizes six main differences between 
European colonial movements and Zionism:  
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1. the Zionists chose their territory according to religious and idealistic 
motives unlike other movements which colonized areas according to their 
wealth of resources; 
2. in most areas, colonizers confronted migrant natives, while the Zionists 
confronted a predominantly rural, and peasant population (excluding the 
Bedouins); 
3. other colonizers were usually supported by military forces of the colonizing 
states, whereas the Zionists did not enjoy such a support; 
4. in most colonies land was abundant, whereas in Palestine it was scarce, 
compelling the Zionists to pay for land, thereby limiting their ability to 
expand; 
5. colonizers were commonly able to use imported slaves as work force, while 
the Zionists had to rely on paid labor; 
6. finally, most Jews chose to immigrate to North America and Western 




In face of these differences, Shafir attempts to explain why Zionism was, and 
managed to survive as a colonial movement after all. Shafir argues that in spite of 
not owning the capitalist and military advantages of other colonial movements, the 
Zionists did enjoy support to some extent, mainly in the form of donations from 
Jewish philanthropists, and later some protection from the British Mandate. 




Shafir identifies six stages of development the Zionist movement went through 
between 1882 and 1948. During these unplanned stages, the Zionist movement 
had to adapt itself both to "land market and labor conditions […] as well as to the 
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ratio between the populations and the characteristics of the Jewish settlers"
99
. The 
first stage began in 1882, when a group of Jewish peasants settled in small plots 
with the purpose of creating a pure settlement colony. These settlers tried to 
imitate the natives' agricultural methods, but realized it could only provide them 
with a standard of living lower than they had previously been accustomed to in 
Europe. As a result, they turned for help to Baron de Rothschild, and under his 
administrative and economic support began the second stage. The Baron provided 
the settlers both with financial support and plantation experts from North Africa 
who reorganized the settlers' agriculture, focusing on plantations (mainly 
vineyards) instead of fields. As a result, the settlement began hiring unskilled Arab 
labor, along with a few Jewish workers. The third stage took place in 1900 with 
the Baron's demand that the plantations become profitable, bringing salary 
reduction and the eradication of unprofitable plantations. In addition, the Baron 
stopped land purchase, pushing many settlers to leave the country
100
. The fourth 
stage began in 1904, with the arrival of the second wave of immigrants (the 
second alyia, in Zionist jargon). These settlers attempted to imitate not only the 
Arabs' agricultural methods, as the first wave of immigrants did, but also the 
Arabs' living standards. Like the first wave, their attempts failed. However, unlike 
of the first wave, the second wave founded national-collectives and socialist 
communes, in the attempt to create pure settlement colonies which would attract 
more immigrants. The fifth stage began with settlers' strategy termed "conquest of 
labor". The Jewish workers decided not to lower their wages, but instead to expel 
the Arabs from the labor market
101
. As a national goal, their aim was to create a 
pure settlement colony. While this strategy failed, as plantation owners were 
reluctant to hire costlier and less effective workers, it was instrumental in the 
creation of the workers' national consciousness. Ironically, the same socialist 
workers who fought for the Arabs' conditions and equality in the labor market now 
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tried to push out the Arabs from the labor market. The final stage began in 1909, 
as the World Zionist Organization began supporting the settlers' efforts, by openly 
emulating the German version of pure settlement colony. This strategy 
emphasized the communal aspect of the settlements, which was later to develop 
into the kibbutz. Land was owned by the Jewish National Fund, and its inhabitance 
and toil were meant for national purposes
102
. 
Shafir acknowledges three distinctive characteristics of the Zionist movement: 
the second immigration wave's adoption of a pure settlement colony instead of a 
plantation colony; this adoption segmented the land's economy into three: the 
Arab, the plantation, and the pure settlement economy, which was to become the 
backbone of the Israeli State's economy; finally, segmenting the land's market was 




Shafir's analysis is important in demonstrating the postcolonial outlook of the 
Zionist movement. As a pioneer in using the postcolonial prism in Israel, Shafir 
opened the door to other postcolonial works which focused on the cultural clash 
between the Zionists and the Arabs, and which explored various dimensions of 
exploitation and abuse on the Zionists' part. What is evident in Shafir's portrayal of 
the settlement process of the Zionist movement is the very specific terminology 
and rigid description, which hardly mention the Zionists' ideological motives or 
their reasons for having emigrated from their homelands. Shafir's description is 
extremely technical, and gives primacy to economic considerations and actions, 
largely ignoring the roles played by political and social factors in the Zionist 
movement, and treating idealist discourse, such as "conquest of labor" as merely 
rhetorical, designed to promote purely functional purposes. This tendency of the 
postcolonial theorists was highly criticized by the "old" historians as we shall see 
in the third chapter. 
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3.3.1 Hegemony and Elite 
Two of the key interrelated terms among the Critical Historians are "hegemony" 
and "elite". The critical Israeli use of the term hegemony is rooted in Gramsci's 
cultural-political theory, and was theoretically developed primarily by Kimmerling 
and later Ram, while the term elite was developed less theoretically, though more 
narratively, by Segev
104
. Briefly, the theory of hegemony suggests that hegemonic 
society is ruled by "groups of social elites" who share common political, 
economic, and intellectual interests
105
. Within Israeli society this hegemonic elite 
was (and some claim still is) what Kimmerling termed AHUSALISM: an acronym 
standing for Ashkenazi, secular, veteran, socialist, and nationalist. According to 
Kimmerling, "The AHUSALIM built [Israeli] society and state, won the 1948 War, 
during which they expelled a considerable part of the Arabs from the State's 
territories, absorbed a massive amount of immigrants and crushed them in a 
cultural and political crusher in order to make them a new nation through melting 
pot mechanisms. The AHUSALIM were the undisputed lords of the land, at least 
during the first two decades."
106
 
From the Critical Historians' perspective, this elite is mainly criticized for being 
intolerant towards new Jewish immigrants, forcing them to comply with and adopt 
the previously established customs and norms; for neglecting the European Jews 
during the Holocaust; and for excluding non-elite groups such as the Arabs, the 
ultra-Orthodox, and the Sephardic Jews from the political, economic, and cultural 
spheres. In this section I will explore the hegemonic theory and elite narrative 
mainly as developed by Kimmerling and Segev respectively. 
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3.3.2 Kimmerling's Hegemony: the Emergence and Disintegration of the 
AHUSALIM 
Kimmerling recognized four stages in the rise and fall of the Israeli AHUSAL 
elite: "(1)The creation of a local Jewish ethno-communal identity in colonial 
Palestine, (2)the attempt to create a hegemonic national identity, dominated by a 
bureaucratized monocultural system, (3)the challenging of this hegemony by one 
of its own inner components, the national religious subculture, and (4)the final 
disruption and decomposition of the hegemonic culture and the fragmentation of 




The first Zionist immigrants arrived to Palestine in the end of the 19
th
 century. 
These immigrants, like those who were to follow in subsequent waves, created 
their own "social and mental 'bubble'", secluding themselves from the local Arab 
population, while depending on it for land acquisition and labor nonetheless
108
. 
Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the organized Jewish settlement 
realized that British Colonial rule in Palestine was to be short lived, and that the 
British would pass state authorities to the Arabs following their departure. 
Therefore, as of the early 1920, the settlement sought to create its own institutions 
and organizations, in order to create a sort of "state-within-state", for the purpose 
of administrating the Jewish settlement
109
. However, several decades after the first 
immigration wave, the Zionist settlement had itself become a stratified society. 
The elite of this materializing society had distinct sociological features, and 
constituted of immigrants from Russia and Poland who came during the second 
and third immigration waves (1904-1924). Chalutizm, (i.e. pioneers) and 
agricultural workers were considered the highest in hierarchy, though this was a 
predominantly symbolical status. Political power was held in the hands of "city-
dwelling party bureaucrats and leaders", whereas the secular and religious urban 
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middle class who resided in the new cities (e.g. Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan) played a 
key role in economic and commercial developments, while being denied 
symbolical and political power
110
. In spite of the differences between these groups, 
they cooperated closely in creating the future state, with the aim of creating an 
autonomous society, and under the umbrella of the Histadrut ("The General 
Organization of Workers in the Land of Israel") headed by Mapai ("Workers' 
Party of the Land of Israel"), established various institutions and services, such as 
banks, schools, sports associations, etc. 
Kimmerling identifies five basic premises of the Jewish settlement, inherent to 
its identity: the future "Jewish commonwealth" was to be established in all or part 
of British Mandate Palestine, and until the community was consolidated, it would 
give preference to absorbing mostly young, able Zionists; the Jewish settlement 
was a direct continuation of the ancient biblical Jewish society; the bible and other 
religious sources were used selectively in order to give the settlement inner and 
external legitimacy; Hebrew was adopted as the formal language instead of 
Yiddish, in order to represent the discontinuation of life in the diaspora, and the 
creation of the "new Jew"; a hybrid calendar was created, made out of secularized 




The pre-Israeli elite (later to become the "Israeli oligarchy" in Kimmerling's 
words
112
), established and fortified its status mainly by having succeeded in 
building a society out of thin air, forming a strong and efficient military force, and 
replacing the stereotypical weak, uprooted "diaspora Jew", with the strong, 
working "new Jew" – the sabra (literally: prickly pear). Excluded from the borders 
of the Jewish organized settlement and the future state were the Arabs, the ultra-
orthodox Jews, the "old yishuv" Sephardic Jews, and the communists
113
. 
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Participation in the construction and modelling of the new state was possible only 
to those who adopted the values, ideas, and customs of the ruling elite
114
. 
The formation of the State of Israel saw the doubling of the Jewish population 
from 650,000 to 1,300,000 with the arrival of immigrants from Muslim countries 
and Holocaust survivors on the one hand, and the decrease of the Arab population 
from 900,000 to fewer than 150,000 on the other
115
. At the same time, a symbiosis 
took place between the Mapai elite and the State of Israel itself. 
The Israeli elite was both suspicious and disdainful of the new immigrants, 
viewing the survivors as avak adam ("human dust", i.e. wrecked people), who 
might attempt to take over state mechanisms. The non-European Jews, on the 
other hand, were viewed as "low quality" human material, which might 
"Levantinize" the state and society. Stereotypically, they were seen as aggressive, 
alcoholic, uncultured, lazy, and unhygienic, having come from barbaric countries 
which had not experienced the Enlightenment, modernity, and progress
116
. The 
Arab and Levantine culture which they brought with them was seen as a primitive 
threat to the Israeli culture, which was rooted in European culture and thinking. 
Finally, as most of the Jews from Muslim countries were religious, they expected 
immigration to Israel to be a religious experience, whereas the old settlement was 
predominantly secular, and hostile to religion. Immigrants who did not integrate 
into the old establishment through marriage and/or by adopting the elite's values 
were made to become manual workers, and were excluded from the centers of 
society by being located in peripheral villages and development towns
117
. They 
were expected to participate in the state's institutions and construction, until the 
melting-pot would rid them of their old identities. Their participation in the 
building of the new state was limited to physical labor, as they were excluded 
from cultural, political, and social influence. Their assimilation difficulties were 
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taken for granted by the establishment, which expected only the younger 
immigrants and the following generations to become "true" Israelis. 
Beyond the social and cultural aspects, the Israeli elite feared the political 
implications of the immigrants' arrival, as the survivors, among whom there were 
many socialists and communists, might seek to "communize" the state, and the 
non-Europeans might align themselves with the nationalist right-wing revisionist 
party. Threatened by and suspicious of the new immigrants, the Israeli elite sought 
to secure its status by creating a new Israeli hegemonic identity. This identity was 
created through a highly centralized "all-encompassing institution" and by 
generating a "new state civil religion, with its own cults, ceremonies, calendar, 
holidays and commemorations […], first around the military, and later around the 
Holocaust."
118
 In many ways this civil religion was a reformation of the pre-Israeli 
settlement hegemony, revolved around the pioneers' civil religion
119
. 
In classical hegemonies, ideologies are produced by the intellectual elite who 
"create the meanings, the world order, and the boundaries of the imagined 
community"
120
. In Israel, however, the academy was marginalized from an earlier 
stage by the political elite, as it contained some supporters of the idea of a 
binational state, an extremely vexing concept in the eyes of the Mapai Zionists. 
Therefore, primary intellectuals were excluded from creating and modelling the 
new Israeli identity, and in their stead secondary intellectuals were made 
responsible for this effort: veteran schoolteachers, journalists and peripheral 
writers, self-educated politicians, and poets. Educational curriculums revolved 
around bible studies, hiking trips, and a selection of translated and Hebrew 
literature. Whereas the settlement's main ethos was collectivism, the state's was 
mamlachtiut, i.e. raison d'état, the state itself. At the center of this ethos was the 
military, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was seen more and more unresolvable, 
gaining a "mythological", Manichaean character, of a perpetual, never-ending 
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. As military service is obligatory, the military, alongside the educational 
system, was also crucial for modelling the Israeli sabra. The militaristic ethos left 
its mark on Israeli society even after it was replaced with the Holocaust (following 
the Eichmann trial in 1961), and consequently Kimmerling termed Israeli society a 
"civilian militaristic" society, in which the entire "social nexus", both 
institutionally and mentally, is oriented towards a militaristic protection of society 
and the collective
122
. As a result of this mentality, groups who do not serve in the 
army, especially Arabs and the ultra-orthodox, are a-priori excluded from 
mainstream Israeli experience and daily life. 
The hegemony oppressed non-hegemonic subcultures in various ways. As 
mentioned earlier the Arabs were excluded from the state's mechanisms from the 
start, and were viewed suspiciously as a fifth column. This was especially evident 
in the martial law which was in effect during 1949-1966, limiting the Arab 
population's movement, but also in the Jewish National Fund's regulations which 
limit non-Jewish acquisition of land, as a result of which no more than 0.25% of 
the land is owned by Arabs
123
. Nonetheless other groups also suffered from 
hegemonic control. Jews from Muslim countries (the mizrachim) generally had 
much larger families than European Jews, and encountered many difficulties in 
adjusting to Israel, especially as the maaborot (transitional camps for immigrants) 
were designed for European families, who have 2-3 children on average
124
. In 
addition, the Israeli mandatory educational system recognized three major streams: 
the General Stream (the secular, urban, and largest stream), the "Workers' 
Stream", and the "National Religious stream"
125
. The mizrachim who were a 
distinct religious stream had to adjust themselves either to the secular or to the 
national religious system, which practiced Ashkenazi, and not Sephardic Judaism. 
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Kimmerling claimed that following the Six Day War, Israeli hegemony had 
undergone a process of disintegration. Following the occupation of the territories a 
new religious-expansionist revival was born, advocating the idea of a "greater 
Israel"
126
. As religious Zionism "rebelled" against AHUSAL hegemony, other 
groups such as the mizrachim and the ultra-orthodox began to organize and 
establish their status in Israeli society. Kimmerling's 2001 The End of Ashkenazi 
Hegemony contained not only an analytical sociology of Israeli society, but also an 
optimistic vision of a possible future Israeli society. Kimmerling believed Israel's 
future lay in a multicultural society, in which each of the seven groups which 
constituted Israeli society (AHUSALIM, traditional Sephardic Jews, ultra-orthodox 
Jews, Arabs, religious-Zionists, ex-USSR immigrants, and Ethiopians) would 
enjoy equality in all public spheres and realize its identity, thereby empowering 
Israeli society as a whole
127
. Fifteen years later, with inter-cultural tensions 
growing stronger than ever, a Hobbesian civil war seems more likely. 
 
3.3.3 Segev's Elite: Zionists and the Holocaust 
Segev's criticism of the old Israeli elite was most explicitly formulated in his 
1991 The Seventh Million. The Seventh Million narratively described the history of 
the Zionist settlement (and later Israel) and its relation to the Holocaust. Segev 
criticized three main aspects of these relations: before, during, and after the 
Holocaust. During the first years of the Nazi regime, Segev claims, the Zionist 
elite did not realize the extent of the danger facing the German Jews. Segev 
illustrates this problem through the story of Arthu Ruppin. Following the Nazis 
rise to power, Ruppin, a Zionist activist, went to Germany in order to discuss the 
terms of the German Jews' immigration to Palestine. "The whole of Germany was 
under terror, but Ruppin found it difficult to recognize the Nazis' revolution. 'Had I 
not known from newspapers and personal conversation to what extent the Jew's 
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economic and political conditions had deteriorated […] – I would not have felt it 
by the street's appearance, not in Berlin, in any case,' he wrote in his diary."
128
 
Meeting with Professor F. K. Günther, one of the leading ideologists of Nazi racial 
theory, they discussed the origins of the "Jewish race" and Ruppin noted the 
professor's amiability in his diary. Segev uses Rupin's and other Zionist activists' 
comments in order to display the Zionists' indifference towards the German Jews, 
and non-Zionist Jews in general. Their main fear was that Jews leaving Germany 
would immigrate to other places instead of Israel, and it was this concern which 
pushed them to sign the haavara (transfer) agreement with the Nazis, which 
enabled the Jews to transfer some of their property to Israel. Following the 
Kristallnacht Ben-Gurion expressed concern that "human conscious" might 
compel other countries to open their gates to the Jews, warning that "Zionism is in 
danger!"
129
. In addition, those chosen to immigrate were closely selected by 
Jewish Agency representatives. The representatives selected candidates who were 
closer to the Zionist cause on the one hand, and who were young and physically 
able enough to assist the settlement on the other. A struggle began between Mapai 
and the Revisionists in the attempt to choose candidates who were closer to their 
political agenda. After the war, Herut, the revisionist party headed by Menachem 
Begin, would accuse Ben-Gurion and Mapai for having saved only young 
socialists and abandoning Jews with different political convictions to the Nazis
130
. 
The immigrants' hardships, however, did not end upon leaving Germany. In 
British Palestine they suffered not only from the weather and plagues, but also 
from the old settlement's condescending treatment. The old settlement which was 
made out of predominantly ardent ideological immigrants felt disdain towards the 
Yekke (a derogatory term for the German Jews, possibly derived from the German 
word "clown"), who preferred staying in Europe, and made alyia only out of 
necessity. Their assimilation difficulties and bourgeois habits were mocked by the 
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old chalutzim who were building a land and a new socialist ideal, and were already 
accustomed to the land's hardships. Most of the 1930s immigrants indeed would 
have preferred to immigrate to the USA or to other places. The Zionists' main 
trouble was convincing the Jews that could choose where to immigrate, that the 
Zionist project was truly realistic and feasible
131
. 
During the Holocaust, Segev claims, the settlement largely ignored the 
European Jews' tragedy, and instead of facing and attempting to help the European 
Jewry, preferred to focus on building the future state. Two of the main 
components of Zionist ideology, "the negation of the diaspora" and "the new Jew" 
had long distanced the settlers from the European Jews. The ideal of the "new 
Jew" was borrowed from similar Soviet, Fascist, and Nazi ideals. The "new Jew" 
or the "new Hebrew" as he was sometimes called was "erect, brave, handsome, 
physically developed, enjoyed work, sports, and games, and was free in 
movements, and dedicated to his people and possessions"
132
. This ideal man was 
often described as a peasant, seeing that working the land symbolized not only the 
healthy ideal of physical work, but also the spiritual connection he must develop 
with the land. "Negating the diaspora" meant juxtaposing the "new Jew" against 
the "old", urban, exilic Jew. The latter was seen as a weak, uprooted, decadent 
remnant of a dying world, a submissive citizen of states not his, at the mercy of 
hostile governments and people, helpless against the occasional pogrom, while the 
chalutzim were reclaiming the honor of the Jewish people. The negative stereotype 
of the urban exilic Jew had sometimes reached classical anti-Semitic descriptions, 
with Jewish moneylenders described in Haaretz as "blood sucking leeches."
133
 
For the Zionists, returning to Israel was the Jewish people's return to 
"normality". Deterministically, Jewish history in the diaspora was seen as 
meaningless in itself, connecting to the land was important precisely because it 
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"anchored" the nation, thus bringing it "back to history"
134
. Exilic Jews were 
resented precisely because by remaining in exile, they were postponing the rebirth 
of the Jewish people. According to Raz-Krakotzkin, after the formation of the 
State of Israel the "negation of the diaspora" took on a different form. While 
Jewish life in the diaspora was no longer dismissed as meaningless, the Holocaust 
itself was understood only in connection with the formation of Israel
135
. The 
clearest example for this is the famous maxim mishoa litkuma ("from Holocaust to 
revival"). According to this axiom, the Holocaust cannot be seen or understood 
without the birth of Israel. Israel is the only "justification" for the Holocaust, 
without which, the Holocaust is meaningless. Accordingly, the Holocaust became 
the clearest secular justification for the State of Israel, as the only moral lesson of 
the Holocaust is that the Jews must live in Israel. All other possible moral lessons 
are discarded in Israeli society. This perception is evident in the curricular 
narrativization of the Holocaust. While Nazism is taught in connection with 
European nationalism and the 20
th
 century, the Holocaust is taught within the 
context of Zionism and Israeli history
136
. The negation of diaspora is also 
understood by Raz-Krakotzkin as the driving force behind the hegemonic 
oppression of minority groups such as the mizrachim, the Palestinians, and the 
ultra-orthodox. As the "new Jew" with its European ideological roots became the 
prototype of the ideal Israeli, the minorities' cultures were seen not only as 
primitive, but also as obstructive to the fundamentally messianic Israeli vision
137
. 
In short, not only did the "negation of diaspora" and the "new Jew" alienate the 
Zionists from the European Jews, abandoning them to the Holocaust, but also 
propelled Israeli hegemony to oppress its minorities.  
Returning to the Holocaust, the Zionists felt the destruction of the European 
Jews might be greater in numbers, but that destruction of the yishuv would 
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annihilate the best of the nation's people
138
. Some went so far as to blame the Jews 
themselves for having stayed in Europe. Davar, the Histadrut's newspaper claimed 
the "destruction of the Jews was a 'divine punishment' for having stayed in the 
diaspora and not immigrating to Israel"
139
. 
The yishuv's reaction to the Holocaust fluctuated between indifference, 
frustrating feelings of powerlessness, and inept rescue attempts. As the War broke 
out, the yishuv felt an ambivalent excitement: the dangers of the war were 
apparent, especially after the Italians bombarded Tel Aviv, but Palestine was now 
a center for British military rearmament, and consequently soldiers arrived from 
all over the world, vitalizing the local economy, eliminating unemployment, and 
developing and expanding local industries
140
. Then, in 1942 as the German Army 
reached Stalingrad a general panic took hold of the yishuv, who feared they would 
soon be in the Nazis' hands, and would expect extermination. This alternation of 
hope and despair was to last until the end of the war. 
While sharing the yishuv's confusion in face of the Holocaust, the Zionist 
leadership, exhibited a cynical, realpolitik attitude towards the Holocaust. Insult 
was added to injury, as the leadership's indifference towards the European Jews 
was accompanied with attempts to promote the Zionists' aims. Aside from several 
symbolic identification gestures (national fast days, organized prayers, cancelation 
of cultural events), the Zionist leadership was mostly concerned with the yishuv's 
wellbeing and the future state. The leadership also saw the war's upside: whereas 
the First World War secured the Balfour Declaration, the Second World War 
would secure the state itself
141
. This, Ben-Gurion claimed, would be the Zionists' 
"political conscience" during the war. The Jewish Agency's responsibility was to 
build a state, not to save "one child from Zagreb" which "sometimes" might be 
more important. Segev also brings Ben-Gurion's most notorious saying: "If I knew 
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it was possible to save all the children in Germany by taking them to England, and 
only half of the children by taking them to Eretz Israel, I would choose the second 
solution. For we must take into account not only the lives of these children but 
also the history of the people of Israel."
142
 In spite of all these statements and 
actions by the Zionist leadership, Segev claims, throughout the years Ben-Gurion 
was presented as a brave, powerful leader, who did all there could be done in order 
to help the European Jews. Famously, Ben-Gurion declared it was the yishuv's 
obligation to assist the British in their fight against the Germans. Nonetheless, 
when serious proposals were made to form Jewish units in the British Army, like 
in the First World War, Ben-Gurion strongly objected, claiming Jewish soldiers 
would be needed for the future Israeli State
143
. 
While the Zionist leadership objected to haapala (illegal immigration to 
Palestine), the rivaling Revisionists continued throughout the war to assist 
immigrants and refugees fleeing Europe to Palestine. This caused Moshe Sharett, a 
prominent Zionist activist, to complain at the "bad human material" they were 
assisting: blind, cripples, and old people
144
. Towards the end of the war, 
nonetheless, the Jewish Agency also began assisting with haapala, but the main 
reason for this by then was to prove the Agency was active in saving Jews. The 
leadership's most famous attempt at military assistance, however, was nothing 
more than a mythologized disaster. In 1944 the Agency collaborated with the 
Royal Air Force in parachuting paratroopers behind enemy lines. Seeing that the 
war was at an end, their main assignment was to get in touch with partisans. The 
paratroopers were kibbutz members in their twenties: symbols of the "new Jew". 
They were also inexperienced and ill prepared for the mission. Expecting precise 
instructions from the Agency upon leaving, they received nothing more than 
empty slogans. "Ben-Gurion told them to act so 'the Jews would know Israel is 
their land and refuge,' so they would flow to it in their masses after the victory 
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[…] Eliyahu Golomb, of the Hagana [the main paramilitary organization] leaders, 
told them their goal was to "exhibit themselves proudly" to the Jews."
145
 The 
paratroopers did little more than risk their lives, however. Half of them were taken 
prisoners, and seven were executed. Local partisans blamed them not only for not 
realizing the danger they were in, believing the war was just a game, but also of 
risking the local partisans themselves. One of these paratroopers, Hanna Szenes, 
was caught immediately upon her arrival, tortured, sentenced, and executed. 
Szenes was to become the main symbol of the paratroopers' myth
146
. 
When the war ended, Zionist activists went to Europe in order to convince the 
survivors to immigrate to Israel. The activists were disappointed with the 
survivors' "empty materialism", which they understood to be the result not only of 
the Holocaust, but also of their prolonged stay in exile. They must have been 
morally corrupt in order to survive the Holocaust. The activists were worried they 
would be useless to the Zionist cause, and were not afraid to tell them they were 
not the ideal "human material"
147
. On the other hand, they were afraid the 
survivors might choose to rebuild their lives in Europe or America. Once in Israel 
the survivors were expected not to talk about the Holocaust. The yishuv did not 
want to hear about their experiences, and when survivors did tell their stories – 
they were not believed
148
. Made to keep their stories to themselves, they were 
alienated from the rest of society. 
After years of silence, the third abuse of the elite was its instrumentalization of 
the Holocaust for social and political purposes. The Gruenwald-Kasztner trial in 
1954-5 deeply embarrassed the Mapai establishment. One of its rising members 
and a longtime member of the Histadrut, Rudolf Kasztner, had reluctantly sued for 
libel the pamphleteer Malchiel Gruenwald who had accused him of collaborating 
with the Nazis. The trial quickly became a deep and disturbing examination of 
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Kasztner's, and through him of Mapai's, engagement with the Nazis and rescue 
attempts. The elite was understood to have wasted a precious opportunity in the 
flop "blood for goods" agreement, in which the Hungary Jews would be saved in 
exchange for trucks and other goods supplied to the Nazis
149
. The Gruenwald-
Kasztner trial, along with other scandals and governmental mishaps, had time and 
again destabilized Ben-Gurion's and Mapai's secured status during the 1950s. For 
the establishment, the 1961 Eichmann trial was an opportunity not only to reaffirm 
its power and morality against the Kasztner affair, but also to create a new ethos 
for Israeli society. Observing that committed idealism was eroding among Israel's 
youth, who were gradually leaving the kibbutz and agricultural life for urban 
pleasures, Ben-Gurion also saw the trial as an opportunity to induce Israeli society 
with new idealistic purpose and vigor
150
. 
The Eichmann trial was famously recounted by Hann Arendt in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, and Segev's criticism focuses, similarly, on its public and political 
impetus. However, in spite of his criticism, Segev's description of the trial is 
generally more empathetic and less critical. According to Segev, Arendt herself 
confessed to him that she had written the book in anger, and would probably have 
written it differently were she to write it again
151
. Segev acknowledges the trial's 
political purpose, its role in raising global awareness to the Holocaust, and 
creating a new homogenizing ethos in Israeli society, but he also notes the 
liberating effect the trial had on the survivors and Israeli society. Whereas most 
Israelis were completely disinterested in the trial in its beginning, scorning the 
weak, pathetic witnesses and their tragic stories, by the end of the trial, Israeli 
society was united in mourning and a sense of a common destiny
152
. Indeed, 
Segev's criticisms of Zionist and Israeli history are much less vehement than other 
Critical Historians, and his narratives do not vilify key characters (in spite of 
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critics' claims), but present them as humans with strengths and weaknesses. As he 
wrote in the introduction to The First Israelis, "For me, the story of those first 
Israelis is basically one of success; I tend to think of them with compassion and 
not a little envy for their part in the historic task of creating a new state."
153
 
Nonetheless, The Seventh Million greatly affected Israeli discourse on the 
Holocaust for several reasons. When The Seventh Million was published in 1991, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem still was not translated to Hebrew, and it was considered a 
landmark in mainstream criticism of the Holocaust, Zionists, and Israel. 
Furthermore, in recent years many works, much more radical and critical towards 
the Holocaust and Israel were published. Books such as Idith Zertal's The Gold of 
the Jews, and Moshe Zuckermann's Shoah in the Sealed Room systematically 
emphasized the cynicism of the Zionist and the Israeli elite. These books, unlike 
Segev's, were written from a distinctively political and postmodern perspective, 
were much more academic in writing and tone, and consequently did not affect 
mainstream discourse as much as Segev's. The Seventh Million was also not the 
first work to have criticized the Zionist leadership's reaction to the Holocaust: it 
was preceded by Shabtai Bet Zvi's 1977 Post-Ugandan Zionism Dina Porat's 
groundbraking An Entangled Leadership: The Yishuv and the Holocaust, 1942–
1945 from 1988. However, Segev's book differed from these works in several 
aspects: it was the first comprehensive account of Zionism and the Holocaust; 
Segev was a famous journalist in leading Israeli newspapers; the book received 
international acclaim; and finally, it was written in a captivating, fluent 
language
154
. Therefore Segev's criticism of the Zionist and Mapai elite, though 
much milder than Arendt's, Zertal's, and Zuckermann's, and relatively sympathetic 
towards Israeli society, raised a storm in Israel, provoking heated attacks on 
Segev's narrative, style, and presentation of facts. The attack on The Seventh 
Million was formulated most clearly by Tuvia Friling, whose analysis of the book 
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became a landmark in criticizing the Critical History, and will be examined in the 
third chapter. 
 
3.4.1 The Palestinians 
Critical Historians have also criticized previous scholars for ignoring the 
Palestinians' part in the history of the Zionist movement and Israel. In previous 
histories, they argued, the Palestinians were either ignored, or vilified as vicious 
Arabs. Reconstructing the image of the Palestinians has been one of the major 
aims of the Critical Historians, seeing that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of 
the most central problems in Israeli history and society. In fact, discussing the 
Palestinians was a challenge in itself, as Israeli public opinion had been reluctant 
to see them as a distinct Arab people
155
. Indeed, in one of the many ironies of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both sides have been reluctant to accept the other's 
nationhood. While many Israelis claim the Palestinians were simply Arabs who 
had immigrated to the territory following the economic blessing brought by the 
Zionists, the Palestinians have continually asserted that Judaism is merely a 
religion, not a nation, and therefore the Jews did not deserve a state (admittedly 
both questions have also perplexed each nation concerning itself and external 
researchers)
156
. Not only did the Critical Historians have to "introduce" the 
Palestinians into the Israeli narrative, but they also had to clearly illustrate who the 
Palestinian people were, how and when did they emerge as a people, and what 
differentiated them from other Arabs nationalities. Because the Critical Historians 
were predominantly oriented to the political left, they also had to exhibit the 
Palestinians' part in their clash with the Israelis from a generally empathetic point 
of view. 
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In this section I will explore the image of the Palestinians in Critical 
Historiography as it is reflected in their origins and their relations with the Zionist 
movement. I will also examine the peculiar problem of writing word Palestinians 
in Hebrew, and the implicit meaning each spelling sometimes carries. 
 
3.4.2 The Image of the Palestinian in Critical Historiography 
In spite of being sympathetic towards the Palestinians, most works by the 
Critical Historians focused on the Palestinians from an exclusively Israeli point of 
view. Consequently, the Palestinians are seen primarily as victims: assassinated, 
deported, raped, massacred, and abused. Nonetheless they also figure as robbers, 
murderers, and outlaws, but in these instances the writers usually focus on Jewish 
victimhood rather than the aggressors. Throughout the works of the Critical 
Historians there is little mention of the Palestinians as a people in itself. One 
reason for this may be that even the Critical Historians agree that Palestinian 
national consciousness developed largely through interaction with the Zionists. 
The only substantial work to treat the Palestinians from a seemingly 
"independent" perspective as well as to meticulously trace their origins, was 
Kimmerling's and Migdal's The Palestinian People from 1994. In their book, 
Kimmerling and Migdal claimed the Palestinians' forefathers were Bedouins who 
came from the Arabian Peninsula in the first half of the 7th century. The 
forefathers were farmers, who nonetheless preserved their warrior identity. Their 
strongest loyalty was to their immediate and larger family, but they were fast to 
sign treaties for material gain. Their enemies, on the other hand were any state or 
authority which attempted to disarm them or restrict their movement with 
borders
157
. Palestinian national consciousness began to consolidate in the 19
th
 
century with the 1834 rebellion. At that time the territory of Palestine, in which 
there were 300,000 inhabitants including 60,000 Christian Arabs, and 10,000 
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Jews, was ruled by the Egyptian Wāli (Ottoman governor), Ibrahim Pasha
158
. In 
spite of enforcing security in the land, allowing the Christians to trade in grain and 
livestock, and improving local agriculture, Ibrahim was extremely unpopular with 
the local population as a result of demanding conscript. The revolt began 
following the inability of several important families to supply conscripts to match 
the demanded quota. The families claimed the peasants had fled the villages, but 
Ibrahim, in light of similar precedents, decided to "postpone conscription in these 
other areas, but to maintain strict enforcement of the policy in Palestine."
159
 As a 
result, riots erupted in the Hebron region. Ibrahim's attempt to suppress the riots 
with Egyptian soldiers further enraged the locals, and united "dispersed Bedouins, 
rural sheikhs, urban notables, mountain fellaheen, and Jerusalem religious figures 




In their book, Kimmerliing and Migdal followed the development of the 
Palestinians through their clashes and interactions with the Ottoman Empire, 
British rule, the Zionist movement, and finally Israeli rule. The writers generally 
refrained from romanticizing the history of the Palestinians as well as from 
sentimentality, and present a fairly objective image of the people. This was partly 
due to the fact that the writers relied predominantly on secondary sources, and 
sought to create a concise research accessible also to the general public. 
Nonetheless, the book managed to enrage right wing Israelis who saw it as a 
radical anti-Zionist document
161
, and failed to satisfy Palestinian scholars, who 
saw it as a fundamentally orientalist work, replete with Western stereotypes
162
. 
Kimmerling presented a more interesting analysis of the relations between the 
Palestinians and the Zionist settlers in his A Model for Analyzing Reciprocal 
Relations Between the Jewish and Arab Communities in Mandatory Palestine. In 
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the paper, Kimmerling analyzed the cultural, economic, and social effects of the 
communication between the Zionists and the Palestinians, and showed how the 
interaction between the groups, changed them internally. The two groups 
interacted with one another (and also with the third ruling group: the Ottoman, and 
later British empires), on two planes: model and concrete
163
. While concrete 
communication represents physical, material interactions (i.e. trade, economy, 
employment), model interactions are concerned with the perceptions and the 
attitudes each group had of the other. Kimmerling examines the Palestinians' 
ambivalence in face of Jewish immigration. Concretely, by introducing new 
capital to the land, the Zionists accelerated processes of urbanization and the 
consolidation of three urban strata ("the a'yan, urban notables who were 
sometimes great landowners; professionals, mainly lawyers, a few doctors, and the 
educated class […]; and the shabab, or urban lumpenproletariat"), as well as the 
transition from autocratic villages, to monetary economies
164
. As a result of these 
processes, Arab society was struggling within itself whether to maintain economic 
relations with the Zionists, and who should profit from the exchange: Christians, 
Muslims, fellaheen, or sheikhs. Consequently, the Zionists were not only 
responsible for the gradual expulsion of the Palestinians from their land, but also 
divided them from within. The Arab population was confronted with an individual 
and group dilemma: while Zionist capital was bettering the conditions of 
individuals and enabling the development of national Arab enterprises (education, 
newspapers, etc.), selling land and labor also meant the loss of land, and the 
intensification of the Zionist settlement. 
According to Kimmerling, cultural interactions were no less puzzling for the 
local population. Kimmerling analyzes these interactions on three levels: religious 
(Jewish-Muslim), cultural (Western-traditional), and political (the Zionists' 
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attempt to spread socialism and communism)
165
. Most of these cultural and 
political ideas were completely foreign to the local Arabs. They associated many 
of these ideas as well as the Zionists' behavior and influence with "vulgarity". 
Moreover they confused the different cultural aspects they had encountered, 
associating Western modernity with Judaism and socialism, and came to reject all 
of these cultural aspects together, associating them with the Zionists. In response, 
the local Arab population adopted and reintroduced traditional customs, growing 
intensely hostile of anything Western, modern, European, socialist, and Jewish. 
The political sphere of interaction was the most important, and also proved to 
be the most fatal for the Palestinian nation. While Jewish national consciousness 
was already formulated, organized, and possessed a political vision, Arab-
Palestinian consciousness was slow to crystalize, lacked a political vision, and was 
helplessly trying to preserve the status-quo
166
. Moreover, the local Arab 
population was seeking for a long while to develop a Southern Syrian identity, 
relying on Syria's expected independence. Attempts to establish a common 
identity through Muslim values also failed, as they alienated the Christian Arabs. 
The failure to create a homogenous national identity was most strongly 
demonstrated in the 1936-39 Arab revolt. The revolt suffered from lack of a 
common political and social objective, and was a mixture of peasant, familial, 
colonial, religious, class, and racial struggles, lacking cohesion
167
. The failure of 
the Revolt, Kimmerling asserts, foretold the Palestinians' failure during the 1948 
War. 
Kimmerling's analyses and descriptions of the Palestinians and their relations 
with the Zionists, despite their overall objectivity, are mostly compassionate and 
empathetic. Their interaction with the Zionists on the one hand, and the governing 
empires on the other, are seen as doomed to begin with. Their national 
consciousness and social organization were continually hampered by their 
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misunderstanding of the rules of the game. Unlike "old" historians, who emphasize 
the Zionists' role in the emergence of Palestinian national consciousness, 
Kimmerling, while acknowledging the Zionists played a major role in this 
development, attempts to downplay it, by emphasizing the Palestinians' struggles 
against the Ottoman and British empires. Kimmerling also goes as far as to 
suggest that the Zionists' presence in Palestine hampered Palestinian nationalism, 
claiming that in other countries Arab national consciousness developed more 
successfully (with the exception of Lebanon)
168
. In spite of generally refraining 
from explicitly criticizing the Zionists (at least in works that focus on the 
Palestinians), it is clear that Kimmerling sees their arrival as damaging to the 
indigenous population, who innocently lacked the political, cultural, social, and 
economic tools to deal with their sophisticated rivals. 
Unlike Kimmerling, most other Critical Historians treat the Palestinians 
predominantly from the perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Commonly, 
these accounts avoid glorification, although they regularly depict the Palestinians 
as the ultimate victims of the conflict. The historians focus typically on the 1948 
War, concentrating both on actions taken by the IDF and the Jewish paramilitary 
organizations (Etzel and Lehi), as well as the leadership's orders during the war, 
and its reactions to reports of atrocities from the front. In these cases the 
Palestinians appear only mutilated, massacred, abused, raped, and deported. There 
is hardly any mention of their lives before the war, except for the rare occasions 
when their peaceful or hostile relations with their Jewish neighbors are briefly 
mentioned. The historians describe somewhat coldly massacres, expulsions, and 
abuses, while highlighting unusual events, the military influence they may have 
had, and the Israeli leadership's reaction to these events. The Deir Yassin 
massacre, one of the most notorious symbols of Jewish violence committed by 
Etzel and Lehi, is a representative example
169
. Segev mentions the massacre in one 
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sentence, only in order to explain why so many Arabs had left their villages (they 
were afraid of a similar fate), although he does add a footnote which briefly 
describes the general course of events: "Over two hundred villagers, many of them 
women and children, were killed. The rest were paraded through the streets of 
Jerusalem and then forced to cross over to the Arab part of the city. The Jewish 
Agency strongly denounced this action."
170
 Morris describes the course of events 
more meticulously, recording the stages and actual acts of the massacre: "Whole 
families were riddled with bullets and grenade fragments and buried when houses 
were blown up on top of them; men, women, and children were mowed down as 
they emerged from houses; individuals were taken aside and shot."
171
 
In the Critical Historians writings' there is hardly any mention of the 
Palestinians' existence outside the context of the conflict and the wars. In this 
sense, the historians did more to question Israeli heroism and "purity of arms", 
than to absolve the Palestinians or present them as three dimensional characters in 
the Israeli-Palestinian story. In many occasions the historians use the Israeli 
leadership's response to Palestinian sufferings, in order to emphasize the 
leadership's cynicism, and heartlessness. For example, upon hearing that tens of 
thousands of Palestinians had abandoned their homes, Segev quotes Ben-Gurion 
as saying, "Now history has shown who is really attached to this country, and for 
whom this country is a luxury which is easily given up.[…] Indeed, it has now 
been made amply clear which people is deeply attached to this country."
172
 Many 
Arabs, Segev claims, did leave their homes, but not their country. The leadership 
is also blamed for silencing reports of atrocities committed by Israeli soldiers. 
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These descriptions by Segev and Morris are typical of the Critical Historians' 
depictions of the 1948 War. The differences between them also reflect the 
difference between Segev and Morris: while Segev writes fluent, captivating 
narratives, full of unusual anecdotes, Morris writes detailed descriptions, 
refraining from personal analyses. Interestingly, concerning the Palestinians' 
victimhood, Morris is one of the few Critical Historians who has emphasized not 
only the Palestinians' victimhood in face of the Israelis, but also of the Palestinian 
people in face of their own leadership and elite. According to Morris, not only did 
the Palestinian leadership refuse to discuss or accept any agreement with the Jews, 
and not only did it incite the masses to war against them, the leadership failed to 
prepare to the expected war, and was fast to flee the battlefield, and secure itself 
abroad
174
. It is interesting to observe that Morris is one of the only Critical 
Historians to emphasize this dimension of the Palestinians' victimhood, whereas 
other Critical Historians, in spite of neo-Marxist leanings, do not differentiate 
between the upper and lower Palestinian classes. Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that Morris' descriptions of the same events have undergone some change over the 
years, most probably due to his political change of heart, and have gradually 
become more concise, lacking the shocking effect of his earlier works
175
. 
However, his findings are still accurate, thereby causing difficulties for devoted 
left wing historians who continue relying on his work
176
. 
Despite the Critical Historians achievements in challenging and revising key 
Israeli myths, such as alyia, and the role of the Zionist elite in Jewish affairs, their 
treatment of the Palestinians has remained relatively limited. Admittedly, it is 
easier to write from the inside about ones' own people, than to write about a 
different people. The Palestinians' physical proximity and shared bloody history 
have further aggravated this difficulty as it seems almost impossible treat them 
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with indifference. Kimmerling's systematic attempts to draw out a profile of the 
Palestinians' relations with the Zionists are so far, among the Critical Historians, 
the most extensive and convincing. Nonetheless, they too seem lacking in scope, 
and too often ignore their own internal conflicts and the more problematic aspects 
of their relations with the Zionists.  
In other works by the Critical Historians the Palestinians are exhibited as the 
main victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but interest in them hardly exceeds 
beyond their victimhood. Only in recent years did Pappé start writing on the 
conflict from a distinctively Palestinian point of view, markedly glorifying the 
Palestinians and vilifying the Zionists and Israelis177. These attempts, however, 
have naturally damaged his reputation as a credible historian, at least among 
Israeli and outside readers. It seems clear that for the majority of the Critical 
Historians, writing as Israelis meant first and foremost confronting their own 
history, and actions. Remembering that revising national memory and collective 
consciousness was one of the primary goals of the Critical Historians, it is 
understandable why the Israelis are at the center of their stories. 
 
3.4.3 The Palestinians: Spelling the Nation's History 
The name Noah can be correctly written in Hebrew in two different ways – one 
consists of two letters, the other of three. The expression "writing Noah with seven 
mistakes" refers to a text that is affluent with mistakes – not necessarily spelling 
mistakes. In the case of the word "Palestinian", in Hebrew it can be written in 
approximately six different ways: 
 ."פלסטינאי", "פלסתינאי", "סתיניפל", "פלשטינאי", "פלשתיני" "פלסטיני,"
In January 1995, as the Oslo Agreements were being implemented and in the 
center of public attention, the Academy of Hebrew Language, following a heated 
debate, decided that two spelling forms will be accepted as correct: פלסטיני, and 
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(palestini, and palestinai respectively) פלסטינאי
178
. However, by May the same 
year, after another passionate debate concerning the exact pronunciation of these 
words, (politicians and radio broadcasters were using p and f interchangeably), not 
only did the committee fail to reach a decision, but it agreed to abolish the 
previous decisions reached concerning spelling, and let any person pronounce and 
write it as they please
179
. 
The Academy's debates reflected by and large not only the etymological 
problems of the word Palestine, but also the political meaning each spelling might 
contain. The most obvious obstacle refers to writing פלשתיני (paleshtini), which 
associates the Palestinians with the Hebrews' ancient enemies, the Philistines. 
While some committee members were strongly against this form ("it might insult 
someone"), others found it resonated the old Hebrew spelling of Mandatory 
Palestine (פלשתינה)
180
. However, both rationales for this spelling carry a negative 
connotation concerning the Palestinians: the first insinuating they are 
contemporary Israel's mythical enemies, the second suggesting they are not an 
actual nation, but merely Arabs who happened to reside in Mandatory Palestine. 
The spellings פלסטיני and פלסטינאי, (pronounced with a p or an f), on the other 
hand, seem the most politically correct. 
Israeli media, and especially newspapers (both print and online), are a good 
example of how political preferences influence the spelling chosen. Most daily 
newspapers, such as Haaretz, Yediot aharonot, and Ma'ariv, use the form פלסטיני. 
While Haaretz is considered a left wing newspaper (some claim radical left), 
Yediot aharonot and ma'ariv are center-right. Israel hayom, the most circulated 
newspaper in Israel, and the most right wing in mainstream media, uses the form 
-whereas the religious Zionist Srugim, and channel 7, and the ultra ,פלשתיני
orthodox Kikar hashabbat use the term Arab
181
. 
                                               
178 Akadem, 1995, p. 1. 
179 Plenary Meeting, pp. 314-319. 
180 Ibid., p. 316. 
181 Gilad, 2015. 
72 
 
As we can see, these mundane choices both represent and influence the way 
entire social and political sectors view the Palestinians. While the left and center-
right acknowledge Palestinian nationhood in itself, the right is only willing to 
admit the Palestinians' "uniqueness" as a consequence of British rule whereas the 
religious Zionists refuse to admit the Palestinians are a distinct people whatsoever. 
The term פלשתיני (palestini or paleshtini) is derived from פלשתינה, the Hebrew 
translation of the ancient, universal term Palestine. In Mandatory Palestine, this 
term was translated by the Zionists to פלשתינה, and the term פלשתינאי referred both 
to the Arab and Jewish residents of the Mandate. Thus, Jewish volunteers in the 
British Army during the Second World War were called Palestinian
182
. Therefore, 
Golda Meir's statement that there is no Palestinian people, as she herself was a 
Palestinian, is essentially correct. Nonetheless, Meir was a פלשתינאית, but was not, 
and as a Zionist Jew, could not be, a פלסטינית
183
. The term פלסטיני (falestini), 
unlike, פלשתיני, is an essentially Arab term. Nonetheless, the Palestinians were 
initially reluctant to define themselves as such, seeing that they considered 
themselves Southern Syrians, and envisioned their future capital in Damascus. 
Only after the dream of Greater Syria began to fade, did they proclaim themselves 
Palestinians. 
The term Palestinian ( נאיפלסטיני/פלסטי , with a p or an f) was slow in entering 
Israeli discourse. During the 1950s the term Palestinian indicated only the 
refugees. With the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 
1964, the term פלשתינאי began to appear in a wider context, while the term פלסטיני 
was figuring in articles by Middle East experts
184
. After the Six Day War and the 
occupation of the territories the terms פלשתינאי and פלסטיני were increasingly 
gaining currency. Left wing activist and editor of the radical Haolam haze (This 
World), Uri Avnery, was promoting the term פלסטין, in order to differentiate 
between "the period in which an Arab majority lived throughout western eretz-
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Israel (contemporaneous 'פלשתינה') and the problem of the people now residing in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip ('פלסטין') along with its exiled brothers."
185
 During 
the 1970s and 1980s the term פלסטיני was becoming still more widespread, though 
the media lacked uniformity. In at least one letter to the editor published in Davar 
in 1979, the terms פלשתינאי and פלסטיני appear interchangeably
186
. 
From their beginnings in the 1980s most of the Critical Historians commonly 
used the term פלסטיני. Even among left wing writers, this decision was not 
obvious: Haaretz had used the terms alternately up until 2009, following the Gaza 
War (Operation Cast Lead)
187
. The one exception to the Critical Historians is 
Segev, who in his books continually uses the term פלשתינאי, which strangely 
enough is usually associated with a more right wing view of the people. Stranger 
still, in his published articles for Haaretz, including those that predate the 2009 
decision, Segev uses the term פלסטיני. 
As we have seen, Israeli academy and society are still far from agreeing on a 
definite spelling and pronunciation for the term Palestinian. While this 
disagreement seems superficial at first sight, it represents in many ways the deep 
fissure in Israeli society's relation to the Palestinians. 
 
4.1 Chapter 3: Criticizing the Critical Historians: the "Old" Historians 
Fight Back 
As mentioned before, the Critical Historians' books, papers, and especially their 
newspaper articles, stirred up many heated debates. The "old" historians were not 
only obliged to protect their professional integrity and objectivity, which was 
being viciously attacked, but also had to reclaim Israel's lost pride. The historians' 
debate took place in two spheres: the academy, and mainstream media. For both 
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debating sides it was important not only to scientifically support their view of 
Israeli history, but more importantly, to shape national Israeli memory. 
According to the "old" historians, the Critical Historians sought to "dehumanize 
and delegitimize Zionism"
188
 by way of vilifying key Zionist and Israeli figures 
and their actions. This was done by presenting problematic events and statements 
out of contexts and by giving them too much importance. Another accusation 
directed at them was that they were importing American postmodernism and 
political correctness. By doing so, they were creating a relativistic reality in which 
the victims were automatically just and the victors inevitably the villains of the 
story, regardless of historical "truth" or course of events. 
In this section I will explore these criticisms as they are developed by key "old" 
historians and philosophers such as Friling, Shapira, Gelber, Taub, and others. As 
we shall see, while these arguments were not without grounds, in the end the "old" 
historians tended to diminish and thereby easily excuse Israel's mistakes and 
wrongdoings. 
 
4.2 Bending the Facts 
The Critical Historians' books contain enormous amounts of footnotes, and long 
bibliographical lists with predominantly primary archival sources. Indeed, even 
their sharpest critics have not accused them of lack of research. However, 
precisely because the Critical Historians were not seen as amateurs, the "old" 
historians accused them of twisting reality for their ideological purposes. It was 
not the Critical Historians' knowledge or familiarity with the facts which was 
being attacked, but the interpretation and positioning of these facts within the 
wider historical context. 
According to the "old" historians, the Critical Historians were, essentially, 
creating a new, fictitious narrative, using real, but distorted facts. This was done 
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by selectively choosing data and stories, quoting heart rending stories when hard 
data was inefficient in "incriminating" the wrong doers, using testimonies without 
verifying their reliability, and quoting unimportant Zionist activists and presenting 
them as dominant decision makers
189
. 
Several "old" historians have taken up the challenge of refuting some of the 
Critical Historians' claims through detailed analyses of the Critical narrative and 
the events as they really happened. The most noteworthy examples of this kind of 
analysis are Tuvia Friling's The Zionist Movement's March of Folly and The 
Seventh Million and David Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust. In these articles Friling 
attempted to reveal the techniques and manipulations Segev used in The Seventh 
Million in order to vilify Ben-Gurion and the Zionist establishment. These articles 
are considered milestones not only in their critique of Segev's book, but also in 
"exposing" the general approach and methodology of the Critical Historians. 
Friling mainly criticized the accusations Segev directed at the Zionist leadership, 
and Ben-Gurion in particular, and what Segev saw as their indifference towards 
the Holocaust. In Segev's book, Friling claims, "the successes of the Zionist 




According to Friling, Segev ignored the difficulty and complexity of the rescue 
operations, and preferred to simply accuse and deride the Zionist establishment. 
Friling laboriously describes in detail all the processes and communications which 
surrounded these plans, in order to demonstrate that the Jewish Agency did all that 
could be done in order to save Jews. Reviewing the Transnistria rescue plan, 
Friling illustrates how Segev creates the impression that the Jewish Agency was to 
blame for the plan's failure, while the Allies and the Germans were those 
responsible for the plan's failure. In the Transnistria rescue plan, the Romanian 
government offered to free some 70,000 Jews who survived the massacre in 
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Transnistria in exchange for 14-28 million dollars (200-400 dollars per head)
191
. 
However, both the Germans and the British objected to this deal. The Germans did 
not want to strengthen the Jewish settlement against their allies, the Arabs, while 
the British principally prohibited the entrance of citizens of enemy states to their 
territory. Thus the plan failed not because, but in spite of the Jewish Agency's 
efforts. However, after reviewing the failed effort, Segev deliberates whether the 
Jewish Agency could not sill proceed with the plan: "and thus only doubt is left if 
the Agency could reach an agreement with the Romanians, behind the Allies and 
Germans backs, in order to save several thousands; maybe it could not"
192
. Segev's 
remark, Friling claims, not only puts the blame on the Jewish Agency in spite of 
having tried to save Jews, but is also absurd, given that it would be impossible to 
secretly transfer 70,000 people
193
. Friling methodically follows the failure of other 
rescue plans, all the while referring to Segev's narration of the same events, which 
belittles and disparages Ben-Gurion and the Agency's "little people"
194
. Instead of 
realizing the complexity, entanglement, and difficulty of the leadership's position, 
Friling claims, Segev prefers accusing the leadership of "Palestino-centrism", 
pettiness, and ineffectualness. 
Moreover, Segev blames Ben-Gurion for forsaking the European Jews, ignoring 
the fact that during the 1930s-1940s, Ben-Gurion was not yet at the height of his 
power, and was far from being the only, or even the most prominent decision 
maker. At that time, the Zionist Jewish Agency was a complex body, with at least 
two rivaling centers, one in London, headed by Chaim Weizmann, the other in Tel 
Aviv, headed by Ben-Gurion. The Jewish Agency and the Zionists were also far 
from being as hegemonic as Kimmerling and others have claimed. At that time, 
the yishuv's most powerful political organization was keneseth Israel, representing 
ninety five percent of the yishuv, including strong opponents of Ben-Gurion's 
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Mapai – the Revisionists. In spite of leading Mapai Ben-Gurion did not enjoy the 
party's support, and had to threaten resignation time and again in order to 
accomplish large scale operations. To further complicate matters, the Jewish 
Agency was not the only organization involved in rescue operations and the 
yishuv. The World Jewish Congress and the Joint were also active in these 
attempts, and the three organizations were interdependent in reaching decisions 
and executing operations. As a result, not only were Ben-Gurion's problematic 
remarks (concerning saving children) not the Jewish Agency's only guidelines, but 
his own status and standing in the organization were under constant attack
195
. 
In the second half of The Seventh Million, Segev accuses the Israeli political 
establishment of cynically exploiting the memory of the Holocaust for material 
purposes. As we have seen, Segev presented the Eichmann trial quite similarly to 
Arendt's depiction: the trial was meant to improve Israel's status among the nations 
and to exonerate the Mapai establishment following the Gruenwald-Kasztner trial. 
However, according to Segev this cynical use did not end with the Eichmann trial, 
but actually aggravated over time, reaching macabre heights in Begin's term, as 
Begin "associated control over the Holocaust heritage, with governing itself."
196
 
Friling agrees with Segev's accusation, especially with regards to the Begin 
administration, but claims Segev has himself used the Holocaust for political 
purposes – "to dehumanize and delegitimize Zionism."
197
 
The Critical Historians' various theories of colonization are also strongly 
attacked by the "old" historians. While Zionism does exhibit some colonial 
characteristics, such as immigration and settlement, as well as its temporary 
dependence on an imperial force such as Britain, colonialism is too limited a 
perspective for analyzing Zionism, they claim. 
The first and clearest difference is inherent in what Avi Bareli termed 
"forgetting Europe". By "forgetting" Europe, the Critical Historians manage to 
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ignore the fact that in spite of emigrating from Europe, the Jews were not 
Europeans in the common sense of the word. After centuries of living in Europe 
the Jews never managed to assimilate. In this sense, Zionism was an expression of 
the Jews' need to flee European antisemitism and pogroms
198
. For the Zionists, 
unlike other colonialists, the "push" factor for immigration (antisemitism) was as 
strong, if not stronger, than the "pull" factor (national revival). The fact the 
Zionists were not "proper" Europeans is also visible economically: the Zionists 
invested capital in the land, contrary to other colonial groups who coveted the 
colonized land's resources, sending them to the motherland
199
. The final difference 
Bareli recognizes concerns labor and exploitation. According to Bareli, the 
Zionists and the Palestinians competed over labor, whereas colonialists usually 
exploited the indigenous population. While it is true that in the early stages of 
Zionism, during the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the British 
Mandate, there was a threat the yishuv would become exploitative of the Arabs, 
this threat was quickly dissolved by the spread of the avoda ivrit (Hebrew labor) 
ideal, which sought to rely only on Jewish labor, in the creation of the New Jew 
and the future state
200
. While material analyses of Zionism as colonialism are 
unsatisfactory, comparisons of discourse and consciousness are also inadequate, 
for precisely the same reason. Comparing the Zionists and the Basel Mission's use 
of symbols and religious discourse, Pappé ignores both the societies each group 
came from, their cultural and social background, and the material differences 
between them. Pappé superficially analyzes a narrow and selective set of symbols 
and discourse elements, and consequently deduces Zionism is a form of 
colonialism. His analysis overlooks both the material and cultural differences 
between the groups, and especially the role the Jews' experience of Eastern Europe 
played in turning to Zionism
201
. 
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According to Bareli, the Critical Historians' reaction to these claims is to 
systematically broaden the categories and definitions of colonialism. By creating 
more and more categories and sub-categories of colonialism, the Critical 
Historians attempt to keep Zionism within their own definitions of colonialism. 
Bareli attempts to explain post-Zionism and the use of postcolonial theories as 
another dimension of "forgetting Europe". Immigrant societies, Bareli asserts, 
have a tendency to suffer from cultural rift, and lack of "identity-communal" 
continuity: Israelis experience a life immensely different from that of their parents 
and grandparents. As a result, they tend to deny their roots and heritage, and 
present themselves as fundamentally Israelis, and by doing so ignore the events 
and ideas which drove their families to Israel
202
. 
Bareli's criticism of postcolonial theories in Israel is undeniably convincing. 
While Zionism does contain colonial characteristics, European antisemitism and 
the rise of nationalism played a central, unquestionable part in the formation of 
Zionism. Ignoring the European factor in Zionism hampers any serious attempt at 
understanding Zionism as well as the structure and consciousness of Israel. 
However, Bareli's claim that the post-Zionists adopted post-colonialism because 
they themselves suffer from this failure is extremely weak. It is somewhat unlikely 
that the same post-colonial scholars who emphasize the immigrational dimension 
from the outset, and who base the majority of their criticism on Zionism as an 
immigrant society, can deny their own roots and origins. It is, however, more 
likely, that post-colonial scholars prefer ignoring or diminishing the European 
dimension of Zionism, in order to establish their theories. This explanation would 
also account for their limited and awkward attempts to target this dimension, such 
as Shafir's absurd claim, which Bareli himself quotes, that Jewish national 
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Gelber has also pointed out serious flaws in the Zionist-colonial prism. In his 
typical blunt style, Gelber claims "[t]he accusation of 'colonialism' that they (the 
"new" historians] hurl against Zionism rests on dubious historical evidence (that 
usually points to the opposite conclusions). It derives mainly from tendentious 
interpretations that mix up past and present and serve to advance Palestinian 
viewpoints on the persisting Israeli-Arab conflict."
204
 
Gelber bases his anti-colonialist paradigm on several points: 
 the Zionists did not attempt to conquer the land by force, but saw the return 
to manual labor as a means to "normalizing" the Jew; 
 unlike other colonialists, they attempted to create a democratic society, and 
sought to rely on natural growth and immigration in order to promise their 
demographic majority; 
 Palestine, unlike other colonial destinations, was a poor country, its 
resources so scarce, both Arabs and Jews were compelled to emigrate from 
it during the waning of the Ottoman Empire; 
 while colonialists took over land and resources by force, the Zionists 
purchased land, causing land prices to rise, and consequently enriching the 
Palestinian elite, who led the Palestinian national movement. Moreover, as 
the Zionists felt guilty for dispossessing the fellaheen, they would 
compensate them in addition to paying for the land; 
 the Zionists did not attempt to integrate into the existing Arab economy, nor 
did they wish to take over it, rather, they competed with the Arabs over the 
labor market, a competition inconceivable in colonial societies; 
 culturally, the Zionists severed ties with the "old" world, seeking to create a 
new society; 
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 finally, in Palestine the Zionists sought to revive an ancient heritage, as can 
be seen in the use of the Hebrew language – in other words, theirs was a 
typical 19
th
 century national revival, and not a colonialist effort
205
. 
Gelber's arguments are largely convincing, though they are based on common 
knowledge, and sometimes lack scientific accuracy and detail. His attempt to 
revoke all postcolonial arguments in a few pages is bound to remain incomplete 
and defective. His claim, for example, that unlike other colonialists the Zionists 
did not use force in conquering the land (unlike the conquistadores they "did not 
come armed to their teeth"
206
), is true, but this was not necessarily out of 
"pacifism" as of from lack of military ability. In 1904 Menachem Ussishkin, a 
leader of the Zionist group hovevei Zion wrote: "[w]ithout ownership of the land, 
Erez Yisrael will never become Jewish. [Land is acquired in the modern world by 
three methods]: by force – that is, by conquest in war, or in other words, by 
robbing land from its owner; […] by expropriation via governmental authority; or 
by purchase […] we are too weak, therefore, we have but the second and third 
[options]."
207
 Ussishkin, and like him other Zionist activists, acknowledged their 
military weakness, on the one hand, and their economic strength on the other, and 
hardly used any moral arguments in preferring purchasing to violence. 
The differences between the first alyia and the second alyia and their relation to 
the Arabs were also more significant and lasting than Gelber suggests. While the 
second alyia had a strong, formulated vision of a socialist, equal society, in which 
Jews and Arabs would co-exist, the first alyia was essentially a materialistic 
society which quickly took advantage of the Arabs' cheap labor, developing 
standard colonial relations with the Arabs "based on stereotyped images and 
behavior patterns; exploitation; and mutual dependence, contempt, racism, hatred, 
and fear."
208
 While it is true the Arabs benefitted materialistically from being 
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employed by the Zionists, they also felt at the same time the threat of being slowly 
excluded from their own land. Their relations with their employers were not 
necessarily pleasant, and were frequently hostile. 
Similarity between the Zionists and other colonizers are obvious in some areas 
such as relations between colonizers and the indigenous population, the 
colonialists' discourse, means of conquering the land, economic exploitation, etc., 
but the differences are also too great to ignore. The colonialist paradigm of 
Zionism is, as we can see, far from perfect, and cannot be taken for granted as the 
only prism through which Zionism should be seen. The political implications of 
"convicting" the Zionists of colonialism are clear, and therefore it is difficult to 
find scholars who approach this question with even the least objectivity. Deciding 
either way involves the recurrent task of "indicting" or "exonerating" Zionism, and 
consequently the State of Israel. In Israeli left-wing discourse, one of the frequent 
topics is the point in which the State of Israel "lost its way". Common landmark 
events mentioned include the Six Day War, following which Israeli society was 
overtaken by hubris and expansionism, the Yom Kippur War, which represents 
Israeli stubbornness and unwillingness to seek peace, leading to a fateful war, and 
the First Lebanon War, which, being the first "choice" war, symbolizes Israel's 
turn to active aggression and violence. The 1948 War, in spite of the atrocities and 
expulsions committed by the Israelis, is still perceived by most, even in the deep 
left which acknowledges the Palestinian Nakba ("disaster"), as a justified war 
whose atrocities are relatively mild compared to other wars. Dating Israel's "sin" 
to the first days of Zionism, however, is more painful to most leftists, who wish to 
believe Israel can return to a rightful way which had once existed. 
Criticizing the Critical Historians focuses thus mostly on their representation of 
facts and events. This representation is criticized for emphasizing secondary 
events and actors who might defame the Zionists and Israel, diminishing and 
concealing substantial and important events and actions, and presenting events and 
statements out of context. Philosophy professor Elhana Yakira has controversially 
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compared this technique to the one used by Holocaust deniers
209
. While Yakira's 
comparison is generally accepted to be an exaggeration, the Critical Histories are 
not free from misrepresentations, as Moshe Zimmermann, a vocal critique of 
Israel, has had to admit, at least in relation to The Seventh Million
210
. These 
misrepresentations are seen as the main tool the Critical Historians use in order to 
present their own narrative of history. However, it is impossible to claim the 
Critical Historians' works are entirely fictitious and unreliable. Not devoid of 
mistakes and political motivation, not only did they bring new unknown facts to 
the center of attention, they have managed to stir a serious debate on Israeli 
history, shattering the previous view of Israel as pure and completely just. Many 
of the Critical Historians have also revised their works, acknowledged their 
mistakes, and have published new works which substantiate their claims. Seeing 
that the historical and sociological discourse in Israel is predominantly modernist, 
the Critical Historians have had to base their research on "dry" facts, more than 
anything else. The interpretation and arrangement of facts are indeed in the hands 
of the writer, but it cannot be said they have taken more liberty in them than the 
"old" historians. The main difference between the "old" and Critical historians is 
essentially in the side with which the writers identify themselves with. While the 
"old" historians see themselves as Zionists, and identify with the history of 
Zionism, in spite of its faults and sins, the Critical Historians are not necessarily 
Zionists, and are consequently less empathetic towards the Zionists and their 
actions. As Shapira has noted, they were less immersed in the exhilaration of 
building Israel than the "old" historians were, but this was less a result of 
generational gaps, as she has claimed, and probably more a result of a collective 
discomfort with the path Israel was taking in the 1980s and the intensification of 
the crisis it was in. 
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4.3 Post-Zionism, postmodernism, multiculturalism 
Many "old" historians have criticized the Critical Historians postmodernism and 
relativism in spite of the fact that most Critical Historians have predominantly 
used modernist methodologies, and have repeatedly claimed to present the "real", 
and not just "another" narrative of Israeli history. Benny Morris has famously 
claimed his initial interest in the Palestinian refugee problem began because he 
"simply wanted to know what happened"
211
. In spite of being mocked for his 
positivistic "antics" by many Critical Historians, most notably Pappé who has 
proclaimed himself a postmodern historian, most Critical Historians, including 
Pappé himself, have continuously claimed their research to be an objective, and 
more "definite" version of the events which took place. Therefore it is interesting 
to see whether the Critical Historians did possess some postmodern characteristics 
after all. 
Gadi Taub has routinely accused post-Zionism and the Critical Historians of 
postmodernism. According to Taub, postmodernism in Israel is not a French, but 
rather an American import, based on American terminology such as 
multiculturalism, post colonialism, and multiple narratives. Israel, Taub claims, is 
similar to America in several ways: both are immigrant societies which have 
disinherited the indigenous population; both have repressed other ethnic groups 
over a long period of time; and both have suffered traumatic social-political 
events: the Vietnam War and the occupation of the territories, events which drove 
the left in both societies to turn its back with disgust on national values and 
identity
212
. As a result, the post-Zionists adopted an American version of 
postmodernism with its political correctness, and veneration of the Other: the 
Palestinians, mizrachim, women, etc.. Focusing on these excluded groups, post-
Zionists have downplayed and blemished the grand Zionist narrative, in the 
attempt to create a multicultural state which would replace the Israeli, or better 
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still the Jewish state. In this sense, the ideal of the post-Zionists is an American 
multicultural society, in spite of the fact that they see themselves as influenced by 
French postmodernism, most notably by Foucault. Critics of this approach point 
out two major flaws in this vision. First, it exposes the post-Zionists' double 
standard, in the sense that while they reject Jewish national identity and the Jews' 
right for self-determination, they recognize and support the Palestinian people and 
their right for a nation. Extreme post-Zionists who reject even the Palestinian right 
for self-determination, calling for a nation-less multicultural state, overlook the 
strong and dominant role national feeling plays in contemporary identity
213
. In this 
sense, the post-Zionists have not learned the lessons of the 20
th
 century, and 
continue to ignore the triumph of national feeling as a uniting factor over other 
identities, such as class. Post-Zionists underestimate nationalism, seeing it as a 
manipulation from above, constructed through "false consciousness" and 
"imagined communities", instead of realizing it is a feeling which spreads from the 
bottom, from the masses
214
. The Second flaw is the post-Zionists' disregard to the 
fundamental difference between American and Israeli immigrant societies. 
Immigrants to America go to it as individuals – they leave their families and 
communities, and realize their individualism in their new country. Most 
frequently, they attempt to discard their previous identity, language, and culture, 
and adopt an American identity, which above all is based on ideology and the 
"American way of life"
215
. Israeli national feeling, however, is deeply rooted in the 
trauma of the Holocaust and the compulsion to flee the Muslim countries 
following the formation of Israel
216
. Jews immigrated to Israel in groups, and 
sought to create a familial society, in which the community plays a strong role in 
one's identity. While immigrants to America chose to sever ties with their families 
and communities, Jewish immigrants to Israel sought to realize and fulfill their 
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long repressed identity. By adopting a postmodern outlook, the post-Zionists 
ignore the national desires of both peoples, and instead offer the dubious solution 
of adopting fragmented identities, constructed from histories and feelings of 
victimhood. 
Taub has also criticized another postmodern aspect in the writings of the 
Critical Historians. Critical Historiography aims at two kinds of revision: 
"classical" revision which seeks to present history as it really happened, and 
postmodern, or politically correct revision, which rejects the concept of a 
historical truth, and strives to create a "gallery of 'competing versions', none of 
which is preferable to the other."
217
 Surprisingly, it was Morris the objectivist who 
grouped together the two ostensibly opposing approaches in his landmark article 
The New Historiography. Moreover, while Morris presented in his Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem detailed evidence concerning the war and 
expulsions, Pappé has based his postcolonial paradigm on formalistic similarities 
which ignore matters of content through a relativistic point of view. Facing these 
discrepancies, Taub seeks to understand what joins such different writers in one 
historiographical group. Taub explains this anomaly not through the scholars' 
research and methodology, but through their initial approach to the subject matter. 
Asked why the Palestinians' rejection of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine (which 
led to the 1948 War) was played down in his book, Morris answered the book was 
not about the war itself, but rather about the refugees problem
218
. Taub interprets 
this statement as Morris' confession that he was not after the "entire truth" but 
rather part of the truth. Moreover, in later articles Morris has acknowledged that 
his motivation for choosing subjects is ideological, but insisted that once his 
research is under way, he treats the data with objectivity. According to Taub what 
Morris, Pappé and other Critical Historians share, is ultimately their negative 
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approach towards Israel, and their attempt to "undermine Zionism's traditional 
perception of itself as a morally pure movement."
219
 
Criticizing the postmodern aspects of post-Zionism and Critical Historiography 
is, academically at least, less convincing and effective than criticizing their 
methodological, factual, and historiographical errors. This form of criticism puts 
more emphasis on the writers' political agenda and vision than on the actual works 
and their content. The Zionist / post-Zionist debate is more of a political-
philosophical debate than a historical one, and is therefore less preoccupied with 
the actual events and the way they are described, than with the potential meaning 
and motives behind their writing. While this debate is interesting in itself, seeing 
that it reflects to a large extent the transitions and clashes within Israeli society, it 
fails to address questions of accuracy, representation and misrepresentation, and 
justice and wrongdoings in Israeli history. In some cases, like those of Pappé and 
more recent postmodern sociologists and philosophers this debate might be of 
more interest than with most Critical Historians who have usually employed 
modern approaches and methodologies in constructing their arguments. The issue 
of the motive behind choosing the area of research is also of less importance than 
Taub has suggested. One should not be hasty in thinking scholars are able to 
approach facts and findings without any ideological bias, as Morris has repeatedly 
claimed, but it is doubtful whether the "old" historians have interpreted data 
without their own pro-Zionist bias. Interviewed about her Ben-Gurion biography, 
Shapira repeatedly emphasized his greatness and far-sightedness, but when pushed 
on the issue of the expulsions, Shapira was reluctant to discuss the topic, saying 
"the book does not engage in moralizing […] I was not evasive. The facts are 
there. Everyone can decide what he thinks about the subject."
220
 Shapira's 
discomfort in discussing the topic is clear, and illustrates quite simply how "old" 
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historians have had to accept, in spite of their criticisms of the Critical Historians, 
some of the new, disturbing facts about Israel. 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
By the 1980s Israeli society had already went through several military, social, 
and political crises, which have polarized Israeli society. Alongside the religious 
Zionists, who supported Israeli expansionism following the Six Day War, the 
Israeli left was becoming increasingly critical of the course Israel was taking, and 
what it saw as the state's militarization and brutalization. The continuing 
occupation of the Palestinians, the traumatic Yom Kippur War which exposed 
Israel's obduracy, and the seemingly pointless and costly Lebanon War along with 
the Palestinians' popular uprising against the occupation, caused more and more 
leftists to doubt Israel's eternal morality and innocence. Historians and sociologists 
seeking to learn about roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were lucky enough 
to come across official documents concerning the 1948 War which were 
previously confidential. These documents revealed that the 1948 War was not as 
heroic as Israelis had been led to believe, and that the Israeli establishment and 
army were responsible for expulsions of Palestinians, and for several atrocities 
which previous scholars had downplayed or utterly ignored. Moreover, some of 
the new historians and sociologists, were significantly influenced by new Western 
European and American academic fads such as post-colonialism, postmodernism, 
and multiculturalism, and sought to implement them in Israeli studies. The 
proliferation of critical historiographies and sociological works in the 1980s drove 
Benny Morris to write an article analyzing the phenomenon. Morris claimed the 
new historians were the first to write the "real" history of Israel, which was far 
from being as heroic and pure as previous historians have portrayed it to be. One 
of Morris' most astonishing discoveries was that, contrary to what for years 
Israelis were led to believe, not all Palestinians fled during the 1948 War – some 
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were deported by the Israeli army and under direct orders from the Israeli 
government. Moreover, the notorious Deir Yassin massacre, while by far the most 
brutal massacre which took place during the war, was not the only occasion in 
which Israeli soldiers massacred and abused the Palestinian population. Other 
harrowing issues addressed by the Critical Historians included the Zionist 
leadership's neglect of the European Jewry during the Holocaust, and its 
maltreatment of immigrants and minorities. 
 Much more than academic literature, Morris' article thrusted the Critical 
Historians into the center of Israeli discourse and debate. Debating their ideas in 
mass media, some Critical Historians, such as Pappé, Ram, and Ophir radicalized 
their scientific discoveries for the purpose of supporting their argument that 
Zionism was a violent, colonialist movement, that Israel won its independence at 
the expense of an indigenous people, and that atonement was only possible 
through the abolition of the Jewish State, and the formation of a binational one in 
its stead. Other Critical Historians such as Morris and Segev were not as 
politically radical, but still believed it crucial for the Israeli people to learn of the 
darker actions and moments of Israeli history. They did not call for Israel's 
elimination, but for national introspection and self-criticism for the purpose of 
expiating Zionism's wrongdoings as much as possible within the Israeli 
framework. All Critical Historians, however, were waging a war on Israel's 
national memory. 
Mainstream historians, who until the emergence of the Critical Historians were 
publishing their own research on Zionism and Israel, attacked the Critical 
Historians, claiming they were falsifying facts and misrepresenting the real course 
of events, for the purpose of sullying Zionism and undermining its achievements. 
Their attacks, however, were directed less at the scientific findings than the public 
pronouncements of the Critical Historians. While it is true that works by the 
Critical Historians were never free from errors, their actual content and 
conclusions were not as indicting and aggressive as the opinions voiced by them in 
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the media. Consequently, the public debate was much more dramatic and stormy 
than the academic one. While public debate centered on issues such as Israel's 
future, and the complete conviction or acquittal of Ben-Gurion and his relation to 
the Holocaust, academic debate addressed issues such as the right perspective 
from which researchers should view their subject matter, and whether the Lydda 
massacre took place because of the Israeli soldiers' lack of experience, or 
mercilessness. 
Nonetheless, with time, mainstream historians had to acknowledge at least 
some of the unpleasant moments of Zionism. Their own research was compelled 
to address and acknowledge the Zionist leaderships' actions and mistakes. While 
some events, such as the Lydda massacre could be explained by the soldiers' fear 
and lack of experience, others, such as the expulsion of Lydda's and Ramle's 
inhabitants had to be acknowledged as pitiless. 
The Israeli public was strongly influenced by the historians' debate. For the first 
time in its history, Israeli mainstream was obliged to confront Israel's part in the 
refugee problem. Before, most Israelis were led to believe the Palestinians had fled 
the land during the 1948 War, in spite of the Israelis' calls for them to stay. This 
was partly the case in Haifa, but in the rest of the country Palestinians were either 
forcefully compelled to or encouraged to flee through harassments
221
. Israelis were 
also led to believe that throughout its history Israeli governments had done all they 
could in order to secure peace with its neighbors – while in truth they were 
rejecting not a few of their neighbors' peaceful endeavors. However, some Israelis, 
especially those who had felt excluded from participation in Israeli public life for 
many years such as the mizrachim and the ultra-orthodox, believed the Critical 
Historiography had exposed the AHUSAL's hypocrisy and cynicism. Confronting 
its past, therefore, meant more to Israelis than merely acknowledging their 
predecessors' wrongdoings – it compelled them to examine their country's present 
and future. Israelis also had to adapt themselves to the new terminology used by 
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the Critical Historians – was Israeli society still being ruled by a hegemonic class? 
Was Israel's melting pot a success or a failure? Did the old Zionist values of the 
"new Jew" and the "negation of the diaspora" lead to a national revival, or the 
neglect of the European Jewry? Was Israel a colonialist society, or was it 
egalitarian? Did Zionism disinherit the rightful inhabitants of the land, or did it 
give rebirth to the Jewish people? Not only were these questions difficult and 
complex, not only did they seem to have more than one correct answer, answering 
them one way or other might well decide Israel's future. 
Since the emergence of the Critical Historians Israel has undergone several 
significant events, such as the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the stagnation of the 
Oslo peace accords, the Second Intifada during the 2000s, the disengagement from 
Gaza in 2005, the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and several small to medium 
scale wars with Gaza. Today, many of the Critical Historians' findings are taken 
for granted: expulsions and atrocities took place; immigrants were maltreated by 
the Israeli elite; the Zionist elite could have done more for the European Jewry 
during the Holocaust; Israel has possibly missed rare opportunities for peace. 
Nonetheless, during those years the Israeli political center has moved further to the 
right, while Israeli society has undeniably gone through a process of polarization 
and radicalization. In today's political climate, many Israelis are no longer shocked 
or distressed by the findings of the Critical Historians. With the disintegration of 
Israeli society, many Israelis are either indifferent to or actually supportive of the 
wrongdoings of the old Zionist establishment. In recent years Benny Morris has 
himself expressed support of the 1948 expulsions, much to the amazement of the 
political left from which he emerged, and which he helped model through his 
discoveries on the war
222
. The Israeli left, on the other hand, has also grown more 
extreme and detached from Israel and mainstream Israeli politics, as other Critical 
Historians demonstrate. Pappé, for example, a former professor at the University 
of Haifa, has immigrated to Britain where he currently teaches, and supports the 
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BDS movement, and the boycott of Israel
223
. Admittedly, the Critical Historians 
were never a homogenous group, but their embittered clashes and fights represent, 
to a large extent, the polarization of Israeli society itself and the violent dispute it 
is engrossed in. 
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